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The Civil Jury as Regulator of
the Litigation Process
Marc Galantert
This paper is not about juries as such, but about their role in
the complex of adjudication, bargaining and maneuver that consti-
tutes the American system of civil litigation. I have elsewhere in-
sisted, not entirely facetiously, that we should refer to this as a
system of "litigotiation," in which adjudication and negotiation are
blended into a single system of disputing in the vicinity of courts.'
In many sectors of our disputing system, jury trials are thought to
form the apex of a pyramid of cases, most of which are settled "in
the shadow" of expected jury verdicts. The effects of juries then
depend upon professional and non-professional legal actors' esti-
mates of the propensities of juries. These estimates reflect what
juries have done-so far as this is known to subsequent legal ac-
tors. Thus, the inquiry is a double one into what juries do and how
we form our working knowledge of what they do.
t Evjue-Bascom Professor of Law and South Asian Studies and Director, Disputes
Processing Research Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison. My curiosity about the
question addressed in this paper was provoked by participating in the Chief Justice Earl
Warren Conference in Boston, Massachusetts, June 12-15, 1986. (A revised version of my
presentation there was published in The American Civil Jury: Final Report of the 1986
Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference on Advocacy in the United States (1987).) Further
stimulation was provided by responses to presentations at Columbia Law School, the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law School, the Proseminar on Public Law at Rutgers University,
the Center for Negotiation and Conflict Resolution at Rutgers University-Newark, and the
Centre for Criminology, University of Toronto. In its meandering course to the present pa-
per, my thinking about juries has benefited from the helpful comments of Bruce Ackerman,
Christopher J. Brown, Robert Hayden, Ethan Katsh, Elizabeth Loftus, Henry Monaghan,
and Maurice Rosenberg. I am indebted to Patricia A. Lombard of the Federal Judicial
Center for patiently explaining puzzling features of the federal judicial statistics, to Christo-
pher J. Brown and the editors of the Wisconsin Law Review for graciously permitting me to
cite from their unpublished research, to Gerald Williams for permission to reproduce his
data in Table 15, to Shari Diamond for permission to reproduce the table in note 73, to
David Rottman of the National Center for State Courts for providing data on state court
juries, and to William Bogert and Ross Cranston for valuable bibliographic help. Suzanne
Cohen, David Tabachnik, Seth Galanter and Jesse Wing have provided capable and indis-
pensable research assistance. Brenda Storandt produced the manuscript with her usual effi-
ciency and aplomb.
Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal Process, 34
J Legal Educ 268 (1984).
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This paper begins with contemporary discontent with civil ju-
ries. It proceeds to sketch the contours of their work and how these
have changed over the past generation. It then examines the way
that practitioner and public knowledge about juries is formed,
communicated and used. In exploring the use of this jury knowl-
edge in the litigotiation process, questions are raised about the ad-
equacy of the received notion of hierarchic control that underlies
the pyramid and bargaining-in-the-shadow images. Finally, this
paper examines how jury knowledge combines with other features
of the litigotiation process to contribute to the sense of instability
and unpredictability that feeds the controversy that was our start-
ing point.
I. THE CIVIL JURY: ITS FANS AND CRITICS
As we enter the last decade of the twentieth century, the civil
jury is largely an American institution.2 In England, a series of re-
strictions reduced the use of juries from 100 percent of civil trials
in 1854 to two percent a century later.3 In 1963, "there were only
27 jury trials out of a total of 962 in the Queens Bench division."4
"All that remains today is an occasionally used statutory right to
jury trial in ... actions for libel, slander, malicious prosecution and
false imprisonment."5 Civil juries are used more often in Scotland'
and the Republic of Ireland.7
In Canada, civil juries are little used outside of Ontario and
British Columbia.' Ontario juries were reduced to six mem-
bers-five votes needed for decision-in 1955. In 1971, some six
2 See Henry W. Ehrmann, Comparative Legal Cultures 97 (Prentice-Hall, 1976). With
few exceptions, all civil jury trials in the world take place in the United States.
' Sir Patrick Devlin, Trial By Jury 129-33 (Stevens & Sons, 1956). Use of civil juries
was restricted during World War I; in 1933, recourse to a jury became a matter of judicial
discretion.
' Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Jury in the United Kingdom 10 (paper delivered at the
Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, Madison, Wisconsin, June 8-11, 1989)
(quoting Michael Zander). Lloyd-Bostock estimates that there have been one or two dozen
civil jury cases a year since 1963.
Id. Even in defamation cases, a jury will "be excluded if the court considers that the
case will involve a prolonged examination of documents, etc." James Driscoll, The Decline
of the English Jury, 17 Amer Bus L J 99, 107 n 58 (1979).
1 McKeown v Arrol & Co., 1974 SC 97; Rodgers v James Crow & Sons, 1971 SC 155. In
Northern Ireland, personal injury cases were tried by juries until 1988, when this was turned
over to judges. Simpson v Harland and Wolff, 13 NIJB 10 (Court of Appeal, Civil Division,
1988).
' Arnott v O'Keeffe, 1977 IR 1.
8 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Administration of Ontario Courts part I
at 331-35 (1973).
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percent of all actions in the Supreme Court of Ontario, the trial
court of general jurisdiction, were on the jury list, as were some 15
percent of actions in the County Court. The great bulk of these
were motor-vehicle injury cases. The Ontario Law Reform Com-
mission noted that "[t]he frequency of requests for a jury in non-
motor vehicle cases is negligible." 9 In Australia, civil juries are
available in all of the states except South Australia, but are rarely
used outside New South Wales and Victoria.10 In New South
Wales, juries are used mostly in industrial-accident cases." In Vic-
toria, where juries are used mostly for industrial-accident and mo-
tor-vehicle cases, requests for juries-usually six members-are
frequent, although jury trials are rare.12 In the civil law and social-
ist countries, where there are no civil juries, the important vehicles
for lay participation are the lay assessors or judges who sit on com-
bined benches with professional judges.'"
In the United States, the civil jury is a familiar and well-
accepted institution. Approximately onei-sixth or one-fifth of all
adults have served on a jury." Three-quarters of adults know
someone who has served. 15 Those who serve on juries tend to find
the experience a positive one and to emerge with more favorable
views of the judicial system and of the jury as an institution. 6 The
Id at 335.
10 Ross Cranston, et al, Delays & Efficiency in Civil Litigation 146-48 (Australian Insti-
tute of Judicial Administration, 1985).
" Id at 147.
12 In Victoria, more than half the cases entering the "major lists" from 1978 to 1981
were on the jury list. But of the jury-list cases disposed of in 1980-81, only 6.7 percent were
tried to verdict; another 11.8 percent were settled during trial and fully half settled on the
day of hearing before trial commenced. Peter Haynes, Julia Pullen and I.R. Scott, A Survey
of Civil Case Progress in the Supreme Court of Victoria tables 2, 14 (1983) (unpublished
paper on file with author).
,3 For example, the "lay judges" described in John P. Richert, West German Lay
Judges: Recruitment and Representativeness (University Press of Florida, 1983); Kalman
Kulcsar, People's Assessors in the Courts: A Study on the Sociology of Law (Akademiai
Kiado, 1982); Maria Borucka-Arctowa, Citizen Participation in the Administration of Jus-
tice: Research and Policy in Poland, 1976 Jahrbuch fOr Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie
286.
14 A Hearst Corporation survey estimates that 16 percent of adults have served on ju-
ries. The American Public, The Media and the Judicial System: A National Survey on
Public Awareness and Public Experience 22 (The Hearst Corp., 1983) ("Hearst Survey").
Gallup estimates 20 percent. Attitudes Toward the Liability and Litigation System: A Sur-
vey of the General Public and Business Executives, No. 81168 at 185 (The Gallup Organi-
zation, 1982) ("Gallup Survey").
" Gallup Survey at 185.
" Bettyruth Walter, The Civil Juror, in John Guinther, The Jury in America 283, 305
(Facts on File Publications, 1988) (97 percent of those having served on juries thought the
jury a good system); William R. Pabst, Jr., G. Thomas Munsterman and Chester H. Mount,
2011
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American public is reasonably well-informed about jury trials. 17
Many Americans think that jury awards are excessive. 18 But on the
whole, Americans think the jury is a commendable and useful in-
stitution. Only a tiny minority would abolish it. 9
This general approval is echoed by judges who have experience
with civil juries. In the early 1960s, the University of Chicago Jury
Project surveyed a national sample of 1038 trial judges. Sixty-four
percent subscribed to the response that the civil jury system was
"on balance.., thoroughly satisfactory," while another 27 percent
thought it had serious disadvantages that could be and should be
corrected. Only nine percent thought that "Itihe disadvantages...
outweigh the advantages so much that its use should be sharply
curtailed. 20
The same strong judicial endorsement of civil juries is mani-
fested in two recent surveys of American judges.2 In a 1987 Louis
Harris poll of 200 federal and 800 state judges who spend at least
one-half of their time on general civil cases, there was virtually no
disagreement with the assertion that "jurors usually make a seri-
ous effort to apply the law as they are instructed. 2 2 More than
three-quarters believed that the right to jury trial should be pre-
served in routine civil cases, and the great majority tended to op-
pose almost all suggestions for restriction of the jury.2 Just a few
months before the Harris Judges' Poll, the National Law Journal
The Myth of the Unwilling Juror, 60 Judicature 164 (1976) (90 percent favorable); Caroline
K. Simon, The Juror in New York City: Attitudes and Experiences, 61 ABA J 207, 211
(1975) (service on civil jury increases favorable views).
17 For example, 79 percent know that prospective jurors can be challenged and 75 per-
cent know that a judge or an appellate court can alter a jury verdict. Hearst Survey at 16-
17.
18 Louis Harris and Associates, Public Attitudes toward the Civil Justice System and
Tort Law Reform, No 874017 at 14, 17 (1987).
" Hearst Survey, at 29, reports that 85 percent think it useful; 6 percent would abolish
it.
20 Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 Va L Rev 1055, 1072-73 (1964).
Similar approval was voiced by respondents to a series of surveys conducted by Professor
Maurice Rosenberg. Only 13 percent of 90 new state trial judges polled in 1965 thought that
the civil jury needed substantial restrictions; the overwhelming majority were satisfied with
the institution. This was confirmed by polls of more seasoned judges. Maurice Rosenberg,
The Trial Judges' Verdict on the Civil Jury, 5 Trial Judges' J 5 (1966); Comment, With
Love in Their Hearts But Reform on Their Minds: How Trial Judges View the Civil Jury,
4 Colum J L & Soc Probs 178 (1968).
" For a strong personal endorsement by a judge who served as a juror, see Shirley S.
Abrahamson, Justice and Juror, 20 Ga L Rev 257 (1986).
" Louis Harris and Associates, Judge's Opinions on Procedural Issues, No 874017 at
76 (1987) ("Harris Judges' Poll").
" Id at 76-90.
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polled a random sample of 348 state and 57 federal judges, repre-
sentative of all judgesin the United States.24 On the whole, the
judges thought civil jurors had been doing the right thing. Three-
quarters reported that they disagreed with jury verdicts in civil
cases no more than ten percent of the time, and only six percent
thought jury awards had been excessive "in many cases."
This general commendation contrasts with the disdain for ju-
ries that flourished in the post-World War II years.2 Many intel-
lectuals viewed jurors as incompetent decisionmakers, animated by
sentimentality and prejudice, epitomized by southern, white juries
who refused to convict those who victimized blacks. The negative
view of juries was given forceful expression in Jerome Frank's
Courts on Trial, published in 1949.26 Frank, a judge on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and a prominent
legal realist, portrayed juries as incapable of rational decisionmak-
ing.21 At the same time, those who managed courts blamed the juryfor their institutional problems:
[T]he slow process of jury trial constitutes a bottleneck
and is the cause of all the delay which has come to char-
acterize the courts and brand the courts in public estima-
tion as dilatory. It is the jury system which is principally
responsible for the flight of commercial litigation from
the courts. Businessmen will not put up with it.2 a
During the 1960s and 1970s, such institutional concerns combined
with doubts about the ability of juries to inspire a scatter of judges
and lawmakers to call for abolition of the civil jury.29
24 The View from the Bench, Natl L J S1 to S19 (Aug 10, 1987) ("National Law Jour-
nal Survey").
21 See Rita J. Simon, The Jury: Its Role in American Society ch 2 (Lexington Books,
1980).
2 Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice (Princeton
University Press, 1950).
27 Id at 108-45.
2 David W. Peck, The Future of the Trial Lawyer, 40 J Am Jud Soc 38, 42 (1956).
Peck was the Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New
York.
29 Abolition of the civil jury was urged by Chief Judge Desmond of the New York Court
of Appeals. Charles S. Desmond, Juries in Civil Cases-Yes or No, 36 NY State Bar J 104
(1964) (administrative grounds). Senator Robert A. Taft favored eliminating juries on
grounds of expense, delay, congestion and the desirability of "tak[ing] the theatrical ele-
ment out of our civil courts." Edward J. Devitt, Federal Civil Jury Trials Should be Abol-
ished, 60 ABA J 570, 571 (1974). Edward J. Devitt, Chief Judge of the United States Dis-
trict Court in Minnesota, himself expressed doubt about the qualifications of juries as
compared to judges, but noted that his "principal interest in urging the curtailment of jury
201]
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Since that time, there has accumulated a formidable body of
empirical research on juries that undermines the premises of the
jury's critics.30 On the "efficiency" side, studies showed that juries
could not be credited with delay and congestion."1 And on the
"competence" side, there is a mounting body of evidence sug-
gesting that accounts of jury irrationality were greatly exaggerated.
The picture of juries that emerges from the research is, for the
most part, a portrait of an admirable institution.2 The estimation
of juries undoubtedly benefits from the general skepticism about
experts and declining confidence in government. Positive feelings
about juries have been reinforced by a long series of highly visible
cases-involving Angela Davis, John Mitchell and others-in
which juries have shown themselves both resistent to prosecutory
zeal and independent of public opinion.
Although intellectual disdain for juries has largely receded, the
civil jury has faced a more focused attack in the 1980s. Observers
who think America is in a litigation crisis view juries as part of the
problem. As with the earlier criticism, there are institutional effi-
ciency concerns and concerns about decisionmaking competence.
Some judges see juries as a cumbersome obstacle to judicial effi-
ciency, preventing needed streamlining of procedures. This pursuit
of "efficiency" has led to widespread use of smaller juries"3 and less
trials is to clean up the backlog of cases, maintain calendars current, and obtain the better
and more efficient administration of justice." Id at 570.
10 The earlier layers of this research are reviewed in Howard Erlanger, Jury Research
in America: Its Past and Future, 4 L & Society Rev 345 (1970). More recent layers are
surveyed in Valerie P. Hans and Neil Vidmar, Judging the Jury (Plenum Press, 1986); Reid
Hastie, Steven D. Penrod and Nancy Pennington, Inside the Jury (Harvard University
Press, 1983); Saul M. Kassin and Lawrence S. Wrightsman, The American Jury on Trial:
Psychological Perspectives (Hemisphere Publishing, 1988).
3 Hans Zeisel, Harry Kalven, Jr., and Bernard Buchholz, Delay in the Court (Little,
Brown & Co., 1959). A recent study of delay in the state trial courts of 14 cities concluded
that "[o]n the civil side there appears to be virtually no relationship between jury trial rates
and median times [to disposition]." Barry Mahoney, Larry L. Sipes and Jeanne A. Ito, Im-
plementing Delay Reduction and Delay Prevention Programs in Urban Trial Courts 14
(National Center for State Courts, 1985).
" Harry Kalven, Jr., and Hans Zeisel, The American Jury (Little, Brown & Co., 1966);
Simon, The Jury: Its Role in American Society (cited in note 25); Hans & Vidmar, Judging
the Jury (cited in note 30); Kassin & Wrightsman, The American Jury on Trial (cited in
note 30).
11 Williams v Florida, 399 US 78 (1970), established the constitutionality of state juries
of fewer than 12 members. By 1976, 38 states had passed legislation specifically authorizing
juries of fewer than 12 members for civil actions. National Center for State Courts, Facets
of the Jury System: A Survey, Publication No. R0028, 4-5 (1976) ("Facets of the Jury
System"). In Washington State, for example, civil jury trials automatically began employing
six-member juries unless one of the litigants requested a twelve-member jury. Wash Rev
Code Ann § 4.44.120 (West 1961 & Supp 1975). See also NJ Const, Art I, § 9, and NJ Stat
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stringent decision rules."4 But to most critics, the jury's sin is not
its procedural cumbrousness, but rather its incompetence, arbitrar-
iness and sentimental bias toward claimants. As one attorney puts
it:
[E]very jury is a one-night stand. It is not very expert, it
is not held accountable, and it never has to live with the
consequences of its actions. Civil litigation often is an op-
portunity for juries to play Robin Hood and redistribute
wealth. As a result verdicts range all over the place.....
Sometimes it seems that the less tangible the harm, the
greater the verdict; . . . Big verdicts on flimsy claims send
an unhealthy message: that we all are victims, and that if
life hits us with any unexpected unpleasantness, someone
must have broken the law.... Media coverage of big ver-
dicts contributes to an Irish Sweepstakes kind of mental-
ity: A person who suffers an accident thinks not just of
filing suit, but of striking it rich."'
A defense attorney concerned with "the crisis of skyrocketing jury
awards" concurs:
Sympathy to an injured party, together with a latent hos-
tility to anonymous and rich corporate America and its
insurance carriers, often set the stage for enormous ver-
dicts which exponentially exceed the earning power of
the product liability plaintiff. The present system is un-
fair in that the amount of the jury verdict often is not
correlated to the injury a plaintiff has suffered. 6
Ann § 2A:80-2 (West 1976) (Civil cases may have a jury of six). "By April 1973, 56 of the 94
federal district courts were employing some form of jury with fewer than twelve members."
Edward N. Beiser and Rene Varrin, Six-Member Juries in the Federal Courts, 58 Judica-
ture 424, 425 (1975). In Colgrove v Battin, 413 US 149 (1973), the Supreme Court held that
a six-member civil jury in a United States District Court does not violate the Seventh
Amendment. By 1976, "some 81 of the 94 federal district courts [had] adopted rules reduc-
ing the size of juries in civil actions." Facets of the Jury System at 5.
11 The Supreme Court, in Johnson v Louisiana, 406 US 356 (1972), and Apodaca v
Oregon, 406 US 404 (1972), ruled that states need not require jury unanimity. The Court
allowed proportions of nine out of 12 in Louisiana and ten out of 12 in Oregon to constitute
a majority for a valid verdict. By 1976, "over half the states allow[ed] for non-unanimous
verdicts in civil cases." Facets of the Jury System at 9.
35 John G. Kester, Are Lawyers Becoming Public Enemy Number One?, 21 Court Rev
4, 8 (1984).
11 Irene C. Warshauer, Limiting Product Liability Verdicts, 28 For the Defense 2
(1986).
2011
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Even certified liberals concur with this- view of the sentimental
jury:
In real life, any theory will do as long as it gets the case
to the jury, whose natural sympathies will usually pro-
duce a large judgment without much concern for the legal
technicalities. [71 Fear of juries leads defendants to settle
suits, whatever their merits. High settlements lead to
skyrocketing insurance rates. And soon ... the activity in
question ... is no longer economically practicable. 8
If the jury is thought to be jointly liable for the litigation cri-
sis, the assault on it is relatively restrained, compared to the exco-
riation of greedy lawyers and activist judges, who are seen as the
real culprits. The absence of any significant campaign to abolish
the civil jury may reflect a judgment that the constitutional guar-
antee of trial by jury presents too formidable a barrier to be over-
come. But proposals abound to limit jury awards by caps on "non-
economic" damages and punitive damages and by changes in liabil-
ity rules, for example, joint and several liability. 9 Other proposals
would divert cases to arbitration and other "alternatives" to jury
trials.' ° Yet other proposals would dispense with the jury in cases
deemed too complex for lay decisionmakers."'
3' This reflects a durable commonplace among elite lawyers. Thus, a liberal Harvard
law professor off-handedly observed that
the impulse that accounts for the volume of personal injury litigation is not the
demand of the parties for an adjudiciation under law, but the plaintiff's desire for
access to a jury where the governing legal rules are at odds with popular
sentiment.
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv L Rev 1281, 1303
n 93 (1976).
88 T.R.B., The Tort Explosion, New Republic 4, 50 (Nov 18, 1985).
" From 1986 through 1989, 32 states modified or abolished joint and several liability;
nine states imposed caps on non-economic damages; and 27 states enacted limitations on
punitive damages. American Tort Reform Association, Tort Reform Record 2 (Dec 31, 1989).
"' For the most part, these would displace bilateral negotiation rather than reduce the
number of jury trials.
" Warren E. Burger, in Thinking the Unthinkable, 31 Loyola L Rev 205, 207 (1985),
suggests "ponder[ing] whether fundamental structural changes must someday be made in
the .. .jury system in civil cases," and calls for limiting the use of juries in complex civil
cases. Compare the results of the two 1987 polls of trial judges, in which one shows that a
majority favor dispensing with juries in certain complex cases, Harris Judges' Poll at 81-82
(cited in note 18), and the other reports a slight majority disagreeing with the suggestion
that the Seventh Amendment should be changed in order to exclude juries from certain
complex civil cases, National Law Journal Survey at S-8 (cited in note 24).
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Contemporary critics of the jury are not animated by an alter-
native vision of the civil justice system.4" For the most part, their
discontent remains within the legalistic mainstream, but tinctured
by a concern for efficiency and an abounding faith in expertise.
The most audible critiques of present arrangements typically in-
corporate a heavy dose of nostalgia for the good old days when the
system worked."3 Defenders reply in kind."" The debate is framed
in terms of admiring regard for the time-tested institutions of the
common law.
II. WHAT JURIES Do
A. The Role of the Jury
The first thing to note about civil juries is that there are rela-
tively few of them. Overall, jury trials take place in less than one
percent of cases terminated in state courts4 5 and in just over two
percent of terminations in federal courts."' Just how few differs
from field to field. Tort cases go to juries more frequently than
cases in other fields.4 7 Within the tort field, patterns of jury invo-
42 On alternative technocratic and communalist bases for criticism of contemporary le-
gal arrangements, see Marc Galanter, Legality and Its Discontents: A Preliminary Assess-
ment of Theories of Legalization and Delegalization, 1980 Jarbuch ftir Rechtssoziologie
und Rechtstheorie 11-26 (1980).
" Examples abound: throughout 1985, the Insurance Information Institute ran a full-
page advertisement in national magazines (my example is from New Yorker 59 (Sept 16,
1985)), depicting a shell-pocked statue of blindfolded justice encased in scaffolding, and
bearing the heading "Now let's restore civil justice." It began with a lament that "[y]ear
after year, our civil justice system has become slower. More costly. Less fair to the very
people it was meant to help." The theme of "[r]estoring fairness, efficiency and predictabil-
ity to our civil liability system" that "is no longer fair ... no longer efficient" recurs in a
recent advertisement by AEtna, entitled "AEtna on the Lawsuit Crisis and Your Insur-
ance," that appeared in the Wall Street Journal on April 8, 1986. This same revivalist
theme underlies a series of Wall Street Journal editorials, culminating in one applauding
Senator Robert Kasten's products liability bill on the ground that "[t]hese reforms are
modeled after the law from the 1200s in England to about 25 years ago in the U.S. In tort
law moving backward would be a step forward." Interstate Liability, Wall St J 20 (May 12,
1986).
See, for example, Scott Baldwin, Don't Debase a 200-Year-Old Tradition, NY Times
B8 (Sept 1, 1985), who cautions that "[t]he system, which dates back two centuries, is not
broken, but the tinkerers would do radical repair that would punish innocent victims and
overwhelm the courts with endless lawsuits spawned by the complex, unclear and unneeded
legislative proposals."
" Among the six state courts for which data is available, jury trials as a percentage of
overall civil dispositions ranged from 0.7 percent in Hawaii Circuit Court, Table 11, to 3.7
percent in Massachusetts Superior Court, Table 12.
" See Table 1.
4 In each of the six state court systems for which 1988 statewide data is available,
juries were found most frequently in tort cases-from 1.9 percent of tort dispositions in
201]
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cation differ from topic to topic: in medical malpractice, verdicts
made up some three to four percent of paid claims.48 Much smaller
portions of cases in other fields are tried by juries. In the seven
state courts of general jurisdiction for which we have data, the por-
tion of contracts dispositions by jury trial ranges from three-tenths
of one percent to 1.7 percent.49 In the federal courts, leaving aside
torts, only civil rights (six percent in 1988), antitrust (4.1 percent
in 1988), "other diversity" (three percent in 1988), "other federal
question" (2.6 percent in 1988), and contract cases (2.5 percent in
1988) have jury trials in more than two percent of dispositions."
Overall, there are between 50,000 and 80,000 civil jury trials each
year in the United States51-out of a total one-quarter million civil
cases in the federal courts and about eight million in state courts
of general jurisdiction.
But the impact of these jury trials is vastly disproportionate to
their incidence. We can apply to the civil jury Kalven and Zeisel's
observation about the criminal jury:
[A]t every stage of this informal process of pre-trial dis-
positions ... decisions are in part informed by expecta-
tions of what the jury will do. Thus, the jury is not con-
trolling merely the immediate case before it, but the host
of cases not before it which are destined to be disposed of
by the pre-trial process. The jury thus controls not only
the formal resolution of controversies . . . but also the
informal resolution of cases that never reach the trial
Hawaii Circuit Court to 4.7 percent of tort cases in Florida Circuit Court. See Tables 10-15.
These tort juries make up a smaller portion of all the tort claims disposed of, since many
claims do not show up as filings. Verdicts were returned in about one percent of a large
sample of paid-liability claims in automobile insurance cases in 1977. James K. Hammitt,
Stephen J. Carroll and Daniel A. Relies analyzed verdicts in a nationwide sample of over
20,000 automobile insurance claims which closed with some payment by twenty-nine insur-
ers during a two-week period in 1977. They report that "verdicts were returned in only
about two hundred cases." Hammitt, Carroll and Relles, Tort Standards and Jury Deci-
sions, 14 J Legal Stud 751, 753 (1985).
"S Danzon reports that seven percent of her sample of six thousand malpractice claims
closed in 1974 and 1976 were tried to verdict. Only some 57 percent of all claims were paid
something, including just over a quarter (28 percent) of the seven percent tried to verdict.
Patricia M. Danzon, Medical Malpractice: Theory, Evidence and Public Policy 32 (Harvard
University Press, 1985).
4 See Table 8.
60 See Table 5.
61 Dr. Robert Roper, then at the National Center for State Courts, estimated that there
were about 48,000 civil jury trials in the state courts in 1984; in that year there were 5510
jury trials in the federal courts. Telephone interview, 1986. Compare Guinther's estimate of
45,000 to 75,000 civil jury trials in state courts in 1985. Guinther, The Jury in America at
167 (cited in note 16).
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stage. In a sense the jury, like the visible cap of an ice-
berg, exposes but a fraction of its true volume.2
To shift metaphors, we might visualize the jury as part of a
system of "bargaining in the shadow of the law." In fact, the
shadow that envelopes maneuver and negotiation in the legal arena
is cast not only by legal decisions, but also by other factors such as
cost, delay, risk, party capability and so forth.53 The jury casts'a
shadow across the wider arena of claims and settlements by com-
municating signals about what future juries might do. Of course,
the jury is not the only source of these predictive shadows.54
The transmission and reception of these signals is a crucial as-
pect of the jury institution. As an institution, the reality of juries
includes the images of them held by lawyers, judges, insurers, liti-
gants, and wider audiences. Juries are present as a threat and as a
supply of markers, both variously interpreted. Hence, what gives
rise to these interpretations is part of the jury process; what
changes these interpretations is as crucial as changes in jury
behavior.
This threat and signal function of the jury derives from the
location of the jury in our legal system. In other modes of lay par-
ticipation in the legal process, for example, justices of the peace
and neighborhood dispute centers, the popular element is cast as
alternative or auxiliary to the qualified professional court. If things
are not resolved in the initial stages, there is recourse to the pro-
fessionals.5 But the jury is located at the "top" of the system
" Kalven & Zeisel, The American Jury at 31-32 (cited in note 32).
" The "bargaining in the shadow" image is set out in Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L J 950
(1979); the elaboration can be found in Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts,
Private Ordering and Indigenous Law, 19 J Legal Pluralism and Unofficial L 1 (1981).
" Numerically, juries provide only a minority of authoritative decisions by courts. Ana-
lyzing some 1649 cases in federal and state courts in five localities, Kritzer found that seven
percent terminated through trial, but another 24 percent terminated through some other
form of adjudication, for example, arbitration, dismissal on the merits, or decision on a sig-
nificant motion that led to settlement. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Form of Negotiation in
Ordinary Litigation, Disputes Processing Research Program, Working Paper 7-2 at 12 (Uni-
versity of Wisconsin, 1985). Default judgments have been omitted from this computation.
" Compare the persistant reports from civil law and socialist countries with "mixed"
tribunals that lay judges are dominated by the professionals. Robert M. Hayden, Who
Wants Informal Courts? Paradoxical Evidence from a Yugoslav Attempt to Create Work-
ers' Courts for Labor Cases, 1985 Am Bar Found Res J 293, 314; Gerhard Casper and Hans
Zeisel, Lay Judges in the German Criminal Courts, 1 J Legal Stud 135 (1972); Kulcsar,
People's Assessors in the Courts (cited in note 13); Erhard Blankenburg, Ralf Rogowski and
Siegfried Schbnholz, Phenomena of Legalization: Observations in a German Labour Court,
1978 European Yearbook in Law and Sociology 33 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979);
Richert, West German Lay Judges (cited in note 13).
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rather than the bottom; the professionals work in the shadow of
the amateurs. If a case involves a sharp contest of claims and elic-
its heavy investment, it moves to the jury, not away from it. And
the professionals are committed to defer to the jury, according its
decisions some, often considerable, finality.56
Although a tradition of experimental studies has revealed
much about what goes on "inside the jury,"57 we know very little
about the functioning of juries-when and where they are present,
what they decide, and what effects these decisions have. In the
course of the 1980s, our fund of this "outside" knowledge about
civil juries has been enormously increased by the pioneering work
of the Institute for Civil Justice, by the enhanced data collection
efforts of the courts in several states and of the National Center
for State Courts, by surveys commissioned by bar groups, and by
the explorations of individual scholars. Without recounting their
findings in detail, I propose to draw from these sources some
points that illuminate the relation of the jury to litigation patterns
and the perceptions of crisis that surround them.
B. Where and When Juries Sit
In many state courts, the civil jury is overwhelmingly a tort
institution. In Cook County, Illinois, from 1960-79, "fewer than 2
percent of civil trials involved non-tort issues. '58 In San Francisco
County during this same period, non-tort cases were in the range
of six percent." Stephen Daniels gives subject matter breakdowns
for civil jury trials in the early 1980s for state courts of general
jurisdiction in six other metropolitan counties." Four have very
" How much do trial and appellate judges exercise their prerogative to modify and
nullify the jury's decisions? See Section D. For an argument that there has been sharp in-
crease recently in judicial interference with jury decisions, see Eric Schnapper, Judges
Against Juries-Appellate Review ofFederal Civil Jury Verdicts, 1989 Wisc L Rev 237. On
the limitations of this analysis, see note 120.
'7 Hastie, Penrod & Pennington, Inside the Jury (cited in note 30); Hans & Vidmar,
Judging the Jury (cited in note 30); Kassin & Wrightsman, The American Jury (cited in
note 30).
" Mark A. Peterson and George L. Priest, The Civil Jury: Trends in Trials and Ver-
dicts, Cook County, Illinois, 1960-1979 6 (Institute for Civil Justice, 1982).
"g Michael G. Shanley and Mark A. Peterson, Comparative Justice: Civil Jury Verdicts
in San Francisco and Cook Counties, 1959-1980 7 (Institute for Civil Justice, 1983). This
study does not seem to give a precise count, but the combined and non-exclusive "contract!
business tort" category includes six percent of all jury trials. In addition, there is a miscella-
neous category that includes five percent of jury trials, but that seems to be made up mostly
of tort cases. Id at 83.
"0 Stephen Daniels, Punitive Damages: Storm on the Horizon?, Preliminary Report of
the American Bar Foundation Punitive Damages Project, Prepared for Delivery at the
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similar patterns of almost exclusively tort juries; the two excep-
tions have about 19.5 percent and 29.5 percent non-tort juries. 1
Available statewide figures for courts of general jurisdiction in
nine states suggest that the civil jury is not so exclusively confined
to tort cases.62 The tort portion of civil jury trials ranged from 46.8
percent to 82.8 percent: the median percentage of tort juries was
67.3 percent.6 Contracts cases are usually the next largest portion
of jury trials-from 8.4 percent to 19.3 percent (median 15.3 per-
cent) in the seven courts of general jurisdiction for which we have
statewide data.6
The most detailed picture of juries in a single state is Patrick
Hubbard's study of South Carolina, which collected information on
verdicts in 26 of the state's 46 counties, containing 80 percent of its
population and accounting for 80 percent of case filings, for the
years 1976 to 1985.65 In South Carolina, over two-thirds of all jury
verdicts were in tort cases: this included over 40 percent in motor
vehicles cases, roughly three percent in products liability cases,
three percent in medical malpractice cases, and five percent in
premises liability cases. Most of the remainder-more than 20 per-
cent-were contracts cases.
In the federal courts, the distribution of civil juries is some-
what different.6 As displayed in Table 5, 5920 civil cases termi-
nated by jury trial in 1988. Of these, 2549 (43.1 percent) were tort
American Bar Foundation Fellows Seminar, American Bar Association Midyear Meeting,
Baltimore, MD (Feb 8,. 1986). The exceptions are Fulton County, Georgia, and Maricopa
County, Arizona. Daniels deliberately excluded family cases and non-money damage cases
from his sample, so the percentage of tort cases may be slightly over-stated.
Id.
62 These states are the only ones that furnished to the National Center for State Courts
jury trial data for the year 1988 that would permit this calculation. State Court Caseload
Statistics: Annual Report 1988 part II, table 2 (National Center for State Courts, 1990).
"' See Table 7.
64 See Table 8. Property cases are the scene of the next largest - but far smaller -
number of jury trials. In the seven state courts of general jurisdiction for which data are
available, property jury trials range from 0.3 percent to 10.2 percent of all jury trials. Table
9. In six states we can assemble a rough picture of how all civil jury trials are distributed by
subject matter. Tables 10-15.
66 F. Patrick Hubbard, "Patterns" in Civil Jury Verdicts in the State Circuit Courts of
South Carolina: 1976-85, 38 SC L Rev 699 (1987). Additional data from the study may be
found in South Carolina Civil Jury Verdict Research Project, Report on Findings (South
Carolina Law Institute, 1986). Unlike the ICJ, see notes 58 and 59, and Daniels, see note 60,
who rely on published jury verdict reports, and unlike the NCSC reports, see note 62, which
are aggregates derived from recorded filing data, the South Carolina study was based on
examination of individual case files in the county courthouses.
6 The Federal figures are for terminations, but some state figures and the ICJ studies,
see notes 58 and 59, are based on a count of all jury trials commenced and include drop-
outs-directed verdicts, dismissals, settlements-and hung juries. See Audrey Chin and
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cases, another 1213 were civil rights cases (20.5 percent), and 1123
were contracts cases (19 percent). The proportion of tort cases
among federal civil jury trials has fallen dramatically in recent de-
cades. In 1961, tort cases accounted for 2102 of 2585 civil jury tri-
als, or 81.3 percent;67 in 1970, torts accounted for 2593 of 3409 civil
jury trials, or 76.1 percent; in 1980, torts accounted for 2169 of
3920 civil jury trials, or 55.3 percent.6 8 Although torts remain a
large component of federal civil jury trials, the number of non-tort
civil jury trials has increased much faster. From 1961 to 1988, tort
juries increased just 21.3 percent, from 2102 to 2549;69 but in this
same twenty-seven-year period, non-tort jury trials increased by
697.9 percent, from 483 to 3371.70 That is, the rate of increase of
non-tort jury trials was nearly thirty-three times as great as the
rate of increase of tort juries.
Federal courts loom larger on the map of jury trials-and thus
of symbols and signals-than the distribution of civil litigation
would suggest. Federal courts handle only about two percent of all
civil cases in American courts, but they conduct a much higher
portion of civil trials, from seven to ten percent of all civil juries, if
our earlier estimates of the number of state civil juries are in the
right range.7 ' And, given the greater preponderance of torts in
state court jury trials, the federal courts are the scene of an even
higher percentage of non-tort civil jury trials.
C. What Juries Decide
It is often assumed that juries are more prone to find liability
than are judges. A preliminary report from the University of Chi-
cago Jury Project a generation ago found that juries held defend-
ants liable in 55 percent of personal injury cases. Judges reported
that they would have found liability in 54 percent of those cases.
Mark A. Peterson, Deep Pockets, Empty Pockets: Who Wins in Cook County Jury Trials
21 (Institute for Civil Justice, 1985).
6 1961 is the first year in which the data are presented in a way that is readily compa-
rable to that in the current reports. Earlier, the count of jury trials was for "judgment on
jury verdict," while in later years what is counted is disposition "during or after [jury]
trial." Thus, the number of jury trials in later years includes cases that settled after jury
trial was commenced and cases where a jury verdict did not lead to entry of a judgment.
Comparison of figures from before 1961 with later ones will exaggerate the recent increase in
the number of civil juries.
6 See Tables 2-4.
0* But the portion of tort terminations by jury trial fell from 11.0 percent to 5.8 percent
in this period.
o See Tables 2-5.
71 See note 51.
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Judges and juries agreed on liability in 79 percent of the cases, and
the disagreements were approximately even-that is, in ten per-
cent of cases judges would have found liability where juries did not
and in 11 percent of the cases in which judges would not have
found liability where juries did. 2 This rate of agreement compares
favorably with the consistency achieved by other pairs of decision-
makers engaged in making complex human judgments. 3
Looking at the Institute of Civil Justice studies of jury ver-
dicts in Cook County, Illinois, and San Francisco County, one is
immediately struck by the stability of the institution over a quar-
7' Kalven, 50 Va L Rev at 1065 (cited in note 20). Jury verdicts were compared with
responses of judges who were asked to report "how he would have decided the case had it
been tried to him alone." Id at 1063.
71 Shari S. Diamond compiled for comparison a set of representative studies of consis-
tency among judges faced with complex clinical judgments in individual cases where the
decisionmaker had to "evaluate and combine incomplete or potentially unreliable informa-
tion to reach a decision." Shari Seidman Diamond, Order in the Court: Consistency in
Criminal-Court Decisions, in C. James Scheirer and Barbara L. Hammonds, eds, Psychol-
ogy and the Law 119, 124-25 (American Psychological Association, 1983). The following ta-
ble includes the University of Chicago Jury Study criminal jury findings, which are compa-
rable to the civil jury findings noted above:
Decision makers
NSF versus NAS
peer reviewers
7 employment
interviewers
4 experienced
psychiatrists
21-23 practicing
physicians
3576 judge-jury
pairs
12 federal judges
8 federal judges
Stimulus
150 grant proposals
submitted to NSF
10 job applicants
153 patients interviewed
twice, once by each of 2
psychiatrists
3 patient-actors with
presenting symptoms
(Doctors could request
further information and
could order and receive
test results.)
3576 jury trials
460 presentence reports
(at sentencing council)
Decision
To fund or not to
fund (half funded
by NSF)
Ranked in top 5 or
in bottom 5
Psychosis, neurosis,
character disorder
Diagnosis: correct or
incorrect
Probability of
agreement (both
correct or both in-
correct)
Guilty or not guilty
Custody or no cus-
tody
Agreement
-Between
2 judges
67%, 77%, 70%
55%, 65%, 57%
439 presentence reports Custody or no cus-
(at sentencing council) tody
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ter-century."' There are changes, but they play out over a frame-
work of stability, both in jury determinations of liability and in
jury awards of damages. The proportion of juries holding defen-
dants liable varies by location and case type. In their 1980s study
of jury trials in 43 counties in ten states, Daniels and Martin found
that in 30 of these counties, "[plaintiffs'] success rates cluster
within the 55 to 65 percent range. '75 They found that "success
rates in [vehicular accident] cases are consistently higher than in
other types of cases."'76 In the 40 counties in which there were
product liability verdicts, plaintiffs won 50 percent in only 14 of
those counties." Rates of plaintiff success have increased markedly
in Cook County during the 1980s but more modestly in San Fran-
cisco. 78 This may reflect changing jury sentiments, but it more
likely reflects changes in legal doctrine-for example, the introduc-
tion of comparative negligence in Illinois-and a change in the mix
of cases reaching juries.79
The median award of damages, in constant dollars, remained
relatively constant over two decades, but in the 1980s there were
marked increases in medians for certain types of cases."0 Mark
Peterson concluded that
median jury award is related to the number of jury trials.
Usually the median jury award moved in the opposite di-
71 In addition to the three volumes tracing jury verdicts from 1960 to 1979 in Cook
County (Peterson & Priest, The Civil Jury (cited in note 58); Mark A. Peterson, Compensa-
tion of Injuries: Civil Jury Verdicts in Cook County (Institute for Civil Justice, 1984); Chin
& Peterson, Deep Pockets, Empty Pockets (cited in note 66)) and the one volume compar-
ing Cook and San Francisco Counties (Shanley & Peterson, Comparative Justice (cited in
note 59)), there is a subsequent volume that extends the comparison to 1984 and includes
additional California sites, Mark A. Peterson, Civil Juries in the 1980s: Trends in Jury
Trials and Verdicts in California and Cook County, Illinois (Institute for Civil Justice,
1987).
" Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin, Jury Verdicts and the "Crisis" in Civil Justice,
11 Just Sys J 321, 329 (1986).
76 Id at 333.
7' Id at 334-35, Table 2. In a General Accounting Office study of product liability litiga-
tion in five states from 1983 to 1985, only 45 percent of the cases were won by plaintiffs.
United States General Accounting Office, Product Liability: Verdicts and Case Resolution
in Five States, GAO/HRD 89-99, Table 2.1 at 24 (1989). On the tendency of liability ver-
dicts generally to hover around the fifty percent mark, see George L. Priest and Benjamin
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J Legal Stud 1 (1984), explaining the
tendency toward a fifty percent rate of liability findings as resulting from the parties' selec-
tion of disputes for trial and also explaining departures from that rate in terms of asymmet-
ric stakes.
78 Peterson, Civil Juries in the 1980s at 16.
79 Id at 16, 19.
80 Id at 20-25.
[1990:
JURY AS REGULATOR
rection from changes in the number of trials: When the
number of trials fell, the median increased; when the
number of trials increased, the median decreased. This
relationship suggests that the total number of jury trials
changed primarily because the number of small cases
(i.e., those that involved modest damages) increased or
decreased at different times. 1
Average awards have risen sharply, but virtually all the growth
in the average is due to a great increase in the size of awards in the
largest cases. Most awards stayed within the same range for the
entire period: the median award in Cook County actually fell by 22
percent between the 1960-64 period and the 1980-84 period.2
A few very large and visible awards account for most of the
money awarded by juries. In Cook County, three-quarters of the
total dollars were awarded to 15 percent of plaintiffs.8 Just three
awards, each over two million dollars, accounted for fifty percent
of all the money awarded by San Francisco juries in the last five
years of the 1970s-and thus doubled the average award for that
period.8
The pattern of jury awards seems to be a two-tier structure of
modest and relatively stable awards in most cases and large and
growing awards in a subset of cases. 5 Peterson concluded that the
trend toward more outcomes that are more favorable to plaintiffs
resulted from the changing mix of cases presented to juries and the
theories under which they were tried. "[T]he trend was not due to
changes in jurors' ways of thinking but to the upsurge in serious
trials involving multiple theories. "8 The appearance of new theo-
ries may reflect not only changes in legal doctrine, but also changes
in the culture and organization of the plaintiffs' bar-the way that
cases are obtained and referred, the dissemination of learning and
techniques, the sharing of information through networks and spe-
81 Peterson, Civil Juries in the 1980s at 29-31.
82 Id at 29. The median award in San Francisco more than doubled during this period,
from $27,000 to $62,000, but the number of jury trials in San Francisco decreased by more
than half, from 1357 to 616, while the number in Cook County remained virtually un-
changed. Id.
82 Peterson & Priest, The Civil Jury at 8 (cited in note 58).
84 Shanley & Peterson, Comparative Justice at 58 (cited in note 59).
88 This subset of large cases is not necessarily growing in every location; as it appears to
be doing in San Francisco. For example, Hubbard finds that in South Carolina, controlling
for inflation, verdicts over $100,000 remained steady at roughly two percent of all verdicts.
Hubbard, 38 SC L Rev at 739-40 (cited in note 65).
88 Peterson, Compensation of Injuries at 43 (cited in note 74).
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cialized publications, and the accumulation of capital to bankroll
expensive litigation.
Are jury awards of damages excessively high? Awards in jury
cases are, on the whole, higher than those in cases tried by judges.
In a study of tort dispositions in 24 metropolitan trial courts in one
month of 1988, the median jury award was $26,500 and the median
bench trial award was $8500.87 Obviously, there is a strong selec-
tion bias; that is, the cases that go to juries are not comparable to
those tried by judges. Comparing jury verdicts with judges'
"shadow verdicts" in the same cases, the University of Chicago
Jury Project found jury damage awards about 20 percent higher
than judges would have awarded-although judges reported that
they would have made higher awards in a significant minority of
cases. 8 Recent surveys of judges give no indication that judges and
juries have diverged in the 30 years since then. Only six percent of
the judges in the 1987 National Law Journal survey thought jury
awards had been excessive "in many cases." 9 And in the Harris
Judges' Poll, only five percent of federal judges and four percent of
state judges reported that they had reduced jury damage awards
more than five times in the previous three years.9
How can we explain the sustained and steep increase in
awards to victims of serious injury? Two contrasting, but not mu-
tually exclusive, explanations might be called the "recomputation"
theory and the "changing consciousness" theory. By the recom-
putation theory, I refer to the notion that higher average jury
awards reflect juror responses to inflation, real income growth,
longer life expectancy, increased elderly income, and medical infla-
tion. Analyzing the period 1975-84, Mark Cooper finds that
juries have adjusted their awards to reflect the basic so-
cial and economic changes that have taken place in the
past decade. They are making awards to their peers that
are consistent with the increasing economic output of so-
ciety and value placed on life."1
In this view, the apparent explosive increase in damage awards
turns out to be "virtually no increase (1 to 10 percent) in product
87 David B. Rottman, Tort Litigation in the State Courts: Evidence from the Trial
Court Information Network 11 (National Center for State Courts, 1989).
"8 Kalven, 50 Va L Rev at 1065 (cited in note 20).
89 National Law Journal Survey at S8 (cited in note 24).
90 Harris Judges' Poll at 87 (cited in note 22).
" Mark N. Cooper, Trends in Liability Awards: Have Juries Run Wild? 1 (Consumer
Federation of America, May 1986).
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liability awards" and "a modest (15 to 20 percent) increase in med-
ical malpractice and wrongful death awards." 92 In this recomputa-
tion view, jurors are engaged in business as usual. The cases that
come to them reflect a different mix of injuries and enhanced ac-
cess to the courts for many victims; but juries do what they have
always done-follow the law's formula for awarding full
compensation.
In contrast, the changing consciousness view, most eloquently
set out in the work of Lawrence Friedman, sees a change in the
way the jury relates to the law's notions about damages. The law of
damages promises to make the victim whole-this is nothing new.
But in practice, this commitment has always been qualified by
competing considerations-by recoil at the expense, reluctance to
impose calamitous loss on the tortfeasor, skepticism about the ca-
pacity of money to assuage the harm, a sense that the victim must
bear some of the cost of his bad luck. But appreciation of the dev-
astating ramifications of serious injury has grown, along with
awareness of the intricate and expensive technology available to
cope with it. There is, Friedman reports, a general expectation that
undeserved suffering can and should be compensated. He suggests
that changing damage awards reflect the development of a notion
of "total compensation":
From the modern standpoint, then, damages in 1850 or
1900 fell short of full compensation. They did not go into
the question of a lifetime of suffering, even allowing for a
shorter life-span. The search for damages went on under
the shadow of an unconscious theory of limits. It is not
hard to understand why. Who, after all, would pay for
inflated damages? Businesses as a whole were smaller
and more precarious than today. The deep pocket was
not so deep. Liability insurance was less widespread.
Even more important was the legal culture, linked to the
[pervasive sense of life's] uncertainties....
These unconscious restraints have now vanished. Al-
most nothing inhibits the jury (and the court) from
searching for, computing, and awarding money that
comes as close as one can to full compensation. 3
" Id at 31.
" Lawrence M. Friedman, Total Justice 63 (Russell Sage Foundation, 1985). See also
the observation in G. Edward White, Tort Law in America: An Intellectual History xv (Ox-
ford University Press, 1980) that
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The relative constancy of the jury response to routine injuries
poses some difficulty for the recomputation theory, for if juries are
responding to changes in lost earnings, higher medical costs, and so
forth, it is not clear why their recalculation in the great bulk of
cases is confined to adjustment for inflation. On the other hand,
the selective pattern of increases at the serious injury end of the
spectrum fits nicely with the changed consciousness view. A series
of compensation studies has shown that victims with smaller inju-
ries tend to be overcompensated compared to their economic
losses, while those most seriously injured recover only a small por-
tion of their economic losses."' Thus, juries appear to be bringing
recoveries into line with the reparative theory of the tort system by
A widespread attitude which associated injury with bad luck or deficiencies in
character has been gradually replaced by one which presumes that most injured
persons are entitled to compensation, through the legal system or some other
mechanism.
Although it is evident that something has changed, it is less clear just how to characterize
this shift. Friedman views it as change in popular culture, but Sanders suggests that it is not
a general change in views but an increase in variance, so that there are now sizable portions,
but not necessarily a majority, of the population that hold views more favorable to high
accountability and high recovery. Joseph Sanders, The Meaning of the Law Explosion: On
Friedman's Total Justice, 1987 Am Bar Found Res J 601, 610 (1987). For a portrayal of an
outcropping of the older, low remedy culture, and considerable unease about the newer, see
the description of an Illinois county in David M. Engel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders,
Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an American Community, 18 L & Society Rev 551
(1984). Some famous pockets of the most expansive and generous juries are to be found in
the southern part of that same state. Richard Greene, "Plaintiff's Paradise" Loses: A 2d
County Faces Threat of Insurance Cutoff, Chicago Tribune 3 (June 8, 1985). In any case, it
is necessary to explain why the impulse to general protection in America has taken the form
of strong tort law rather than the kind of comprehensive welfare state that is found in other
industrial societies.
" Alfred F. Conard and his associates studied the reparations of all the victims of auto-
mobile accidents that occurred in Michigan in 1958. Examining payments from all sources,
they found that
When the economic loss was under $1000, the chances were quite good that it
would be paid for with something left over for psychic loss. But when the [eco-
nomic] loss was a crushing one-over $10,000 for instance-it was very rare that
the reparation even came close to matching economic loss. Two-thirds of the per-
sons with such severe losses received less than a quarter of their economic losses,
with no consideration of psychic losses.
Alfred F. Conard, et al, Automobile Accident Costs and Payments: Studies in the Econom-
ics of Injury Reparation 179 (University of Michigan Press, 1964). When tort recovery was
examined separately, the same pattern of underpayment of large losses prevailed:
Most (victims with large losses] got less than 25 percent of their economic loss,
and none passed 75 percent. The smaller the loss, the higher the percent of settle-
ment; the larger the loss, the smaller the percent of settlement.
Id at 196. A national survey of compensation of victims of 1967 automobile accidents found
the same pattern:
[Moving from] the lowest economic loss class to . . . the highest economic loss
class, the ratio of reparations to loss drops from 1.8 to 0.2. That is, those with
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responding to a fuller notion of the whole loss in cases of cata-
strophic injury. Indeed, if we accept the notion of increased loss
implicit in Cooper's recalculation theory, we might conclude that
contemporary juries are, in effect, reducing the level of awards in
most small injury casese-perhaps again aligning the pattern of
recoveries with legal standards.
If contemporary juries have given new content to the norm of
"making whole" the injured-at least some of them-we should
not necessarily expect that the trend towards more expansive in-
terpretation of this norm will proceed indefinitely. Further devel-
opments of technology and of empathy may enlarge this "making
whole" commitment to a point where new limits assert themselves,
just as the commitment to a social norm of the absolute value of
small economic losses recover, on the average, nearly twice their loss, but those
with high economic losses [that is, $25,000 and over] recover only one-fifth.
United States Department of Transportation, 1 Economic Consequences of Automobile Ac-
cident Injuries 38-39 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970). The calculation here in-
cludes reparations from all sources of liability, not only tort. The tort system supplied
roughly one-third of all the money recovered by these victims, but "recovery under tort is
relatively less for large losses than for small losses." Those with the smallest economic losses
(less than $499) received 74.4 percent of their recovery through tort; those with losses of
$25,000 and over received only 17.3 percent through the tort system. Id at 44-45.
A survey of 53,164 automobile personal injury claims paid by insurers representing 61.7
percent of the nationwide auto insurance business conducted by an insurance industry re-
search group found that
There was a tendency for persons with small economic losses to receive more re-
imbursement per dollar of loss than persons with large economic losses under all
types of benefit sources, government and private. As a group, persons with eco-
nomic losses up to $2,500 received payments of more than $2 for every $1 of eco-
nomic loss. Those with losses between $2,501 and $10,000 received more than $1
for each $1 of loss, while those with losses between $10,0001 and $25,000 received
$.97 and the four persons with losses over $25,000 received $79 per $1 of economic
loss.
1 Automobile Injuries and their Compensation in the United States 17-18 (All-Industry
Research Advisory Comittee, 1979). These are all automobile victim studies, so the low pay-
ments for big injuries may be influenced by low policy limits. But the same pattern appears
in a study of large product liability claims closed in 1985. Claimants with less than $100,000
of economic loss collected 5.31 times their economic loss, while claimants with more than $1
million of economic loss collected 0.58 of their economic loss. Lawrence W. Soular, A Study
of Large Product Liability Claims Closed in 1985 18 (American Insurance Association,
1986).
The pattern that recurs in these aggregate studies is echoed in Rosenthal's detailed
study of 57 personal injury cases: "The more a claim is worth the less favorable the recovery
is likely to be .... The smaller the claim, the better the chances of a fair return." Douglas
Rosenthal, Lawyer and Client: Who's in Charge? 78 (Russell Sage Foundation, 1974).
"' Not all of Cooper's social and economic change factors are as relevant to small and
temporary injuries as to large and permanent ones, but some are. And if we imagine juries
taking into account increased expenditures, should we attribute to them a greater awareness
of other sources of compensation?
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life may be read more restrictively as the technological possibilities
and costs of sustaining life expand. In both cases, readiness to re-
spond with heroic generosity when faced with instances of individ-
ual disaster leads to the question of what levels of response can be
institutionalized on a routine and general basis.
These high awards, even if justified by established legal stan-
dards, may put pressure on other features of the civil liability sys-
tem. One basic feature that may be less stable than it recently ap-
peared is the notion of the "once and for all" award of damages, in
which all uncertainties are compounded in a single lump sum. It
has already been modified by the acceptance of the structured set-
tlement, which has accustomed parties to the notion of a periodic
and adjustable payout. Provision for optional or mandatory peri-
odic payments had been enacted in fifteen states through 1989 and
proposed in many more." We may be moving toward allowing ju-
ries to award an adjustable. stream of payments, which would en-
tail some administrative machinery for making subsequent
adjustments.
The Institute for Civil Justice's jury studies display the power-
ful association of case-type with variations in process and out-
come. 7 The percentage of plaintiff victories differs substantially by
case type. 8 In addition, there is a patterned difference in damages
by case-type and different trends in the level of awards-for exam-
ple, while the typical award for other case-types increased, the me-
dian award in Cook County for the most numerous type, automo-
bile accidents, "decreased steadily, if slowly, throughout the entire
period." 9 These patterns held up when recoveries were controlled
for identity of litigants and seriousness of injury. "Even when liti-
gants and injuries were similar, a plaintiff in a work injury case
received twice the award of a plaintiff in an injury-on-property
90 American Tort Reform Association, Tort Reform Record 1 (Dec 31, 1989) (cited in
note 39).
11 As Peterson summarized it,
Throughout the 20 years, Cook County seemed to have two tiers of justice. Plain-
tiffs in automobile accident, intentional tort, common carrier, injury on property,
and dramshop cases received modest awards; for the same injuries, plaintiffs in
work injury, malpractice, product liability, and (increasingly) street hazard cases
received a great deal more.
Peterson, Compensation of Injuries at 56 (cited in note 74).
98 Peterson & Priest, The Civil Jury at 19 (cited in note 58) ("liability verdicts varied
more among types of lawsuits than among jurisdictions"); Peterson, Civil Juries in the
1980s at 42 (cited in note 74). Compare Daniels & Martin, 11 Just Sys J at 339 (cited in note
75).
.. Peterson & Priest, The Civil Jury at 27.
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case." 100 These case-type patterns provide a more fine-grained in-
stance of the Civil Litigation Research Project's findings that the
translation of injuries into claims and disputes differs substantially
from field to field-for example, between tort complaints and dis-
crimination complaints.10 '
Litigant identity did have an effect on outcomes, but it, too,
operated on two tiers. Contrary to litigation explosion lore, busi-
nesses and government units were, on the whole, more successful
with juries than were individuals.' In cases involving ordinary in-
juries, government and corporate defendants were no more likely
to be found liable than other defendants. "But when they were
sued by plaintiffs with severe, permanent injuries, corporations
were found liable more often than other defendants," and they
usually paid larger awards. 0 These patterns have remained con-
stant over two decades. 4 The differential response to corporate
defendants is commonly attributed to the presence of deep corpo-
rate pockets, an explanation that fails to account for the favorable
treatment of corporations in ordinary cases.'05
We should, of course, beware of taking a single county as rep-
resentative. While the ICJ studies provide a comparison of Cook
County with San Francisco, 06 we do not get a sense of profound
differences between the culture of juries at these two sites. The
uses of the jury, however, differ in these localities. For example,
there are more contract and business cases in San Francisco than
in Cook County, more high-stakes cases and fewer automobile acci-
dents, and San Francisco juries were more likely to find liability.'07
100 Chin & Peterson, Deep Pockets, Empty Pockets at 54 (cited in note 66).
"' Richard Miller and Austin Sarat, Grievance, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the
Adversary Culture, 15 L & Soc Rev 525, 537 (1980-81). Replicating the CLRP research in
Australia, Fitzgerald concluded that "by far the most powerful explanatory factor" for the
career of a dispute was the type of grievance involved. Jeffrey Fitzgerald, Grievances, Dis-
putes and Outcomes: A Comparison of Australia and the United States, 1 Law in Context
15, 39 (1983). On the notion that the careers of various case-types reflect differing institu-
tionalization of different kinds of troubles and injuries, see Leon H. Mayhew, Institutions of
Representation: Civil Justice and the Public, 9 L & Soc Rev 401 (1975).
102 Chin & Peterson, Deep Pockets, Empty Pockets at 25.
'o' Id at 42-43.
104 Id at 44.
'01 An interesting alternative to the "deep pocket" theory-that the public holds corpo-
rations to a higher standard of behavior and thus attributes to corporations inexcusable
recklessness in situations where an individual would be judged less harshly-is suggested by
Valerie P. Hans and H. David Ermann, Responses to Corporate Versus Individual Wrong-
doing, 13 L & Human Beh 151 (1989).
100 See notes 58 and 59.
107 Shanley & Peterson, Comparative Justice at 11 (cited in note 59). Plaintiff victories
were 59 percent in San Francisco, 52 percent in Cook County.
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Similarly, Daniels' study of punitive damages suggests very differ-
ent local patterns in the incidence and amount of punitive damage
awards. s08 Apparently, differences in jury use and behavior are part
of the persisting patterns of variation that we summarize under the
rubric of "local legal cultures."' 019 We may safely surmise that the
regulars in any locality have different expectations about, for ex-
ample, when juries should be used and what they are likely to do.
How much these differences derive from differences in the culture
of juries is unknown."'
D. After the Verdict
We should be careful not to equate jury verdicts with the ulti-
mate outcomes of disputes."' Verdicts may be modified on post-
trial motion or on appeal; or they may be discounted in negotia-
tions with an eye to these contingencies, as well as others, such as
difficulties of collection. It might be more accurate to think of the
jury as providing the winner with a formidable bargaining counter,
but one that may discounted, either slightly or completely. 1 2 The
contours of award attrition are only beginning to emerge.
Only a small fraction of jury verdicts are disturbed by appel-
late courts. A Federal Judicial Center study examined the histories
1o8 Daniels, Punitive Damages at Table 1 (cited in note 60).
109 On these persisting and patterned differences among norms, understanding, con-
cerns and priorities shared by legal actors and audiences in different localities, see Marc
Galanter, Adjudication, Litigation and Related Phenomena, in Leon Lipson and Stanton
Wheeler, eds, Law and the Social Sciences 151, 181-82 (Russell Sage Foundation, 1987),
and references cited therein.
"o By the "culture of juries" I refer to recurring propensities of juries in a locality, not
to a communicated tradition of jury lore-although the latter may exist in some cases. Com-
pare note 93.
.. Much of the literature of alarm about excessive litigation takes awards as equivalent
to outcomes and often conflates settlements, awards and judgments. For example, a medical
society president writes of "juries ... awarding settlements akin to lottery prizes," Gloria
Aitken, Letter to the Editor, NY Times A26 (Oct 16, 1985). And a United States Senator
reports that "[h]uge settlements are being awarded for 'pain and suffering' that far exceed
the bounds of reasonableness." Mitch McConnell, Letter to the Editor, NY Times A22
(June 8, 1986).
1I Jurors, in turn, may attempt to take this discounting into account. In a case in
which a Texas jury awarded $64,000,000 to an injured worker, it was reported that
The jurors also were well aware that big judgments often are reduced on ap-
peal .... We knew the case would be appealed," recalls Ms. McIlroy, "so we
wanted to give him a lot to start with before it was reduced." Or as [another juror
in the same case] reasoned, "I went along with it ... because I figured it would be
reduced by a judge or on appeal."
Monica Langley, Generous Juries: In Awarding Damages, Panels Have Reasons for Think-
ing Big, NY Times Al, A20 (May 19, 1986).
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of 18,528 cases that terminated after full trial in the federal dis-
trict courts between July 1976, and the end of 1978.113 About one-
third of these were jury trials. Twenty-two percent of the jury tri-
als led to appeals, as did 24 percent of the bench trials. 114 Seven-
teen percent of the jury appeals concluded with reversal or re-
mand, as did 19 percent of the appeals from bench trials." 5 Thus,
results of jury trial were disturbed at the appellate level in only
four percent of the cases.
Appeal is only one source of post-trial adjustment. Shanley
and Peterson, studying verdicts rendered in 1982-84 in Cook
County, Illinois, San Francisco and other California counties,
found that 80 percent of jury verdicts remained unchanged after
trial, but post-trial processes resulted in lower payments in 15 per-
cent of cases (about one-quarter of the cases in which plaintiffs
had prevailed). The larger the award, the smaller the percentage
actually paid: 93 percent of awards under $100,000 was paid, com-
pared to only 57 percent of awards of more than $10,000,000. Re-
ductions differed little by locality or case-type, except that payouts
were lower in cases involving intentional torts and punitive dam-
ages, and were higher in cases involving corporate or organizational
defendants."' A study of 198 verdicts of one million dollars or
more returned in 1984 and 1985 found that almost three-quarters
of these cases were subject to some reduction; disbursements to
plaintiffs were only 43 percent of the original verdict amounts."' A
recent General Accounting Office study of product liability litiga-
tion in five states found that the ratio of payments to amounts
awarded was 76 percent in cases where only compensatory dam-
ages were awarded, but dropped to 39 percent in cases were there
were punitive as well as compensatory damages." 8 The ratio of
payment in all cases taken together was 40 percent." 9 The amount
of reduction differed from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
1"' Gordon Bermant, et al, Protracted Civil Trials: Views from the Bench and the Bar
(Federal Judicial Center, 1981).
" Id at 41.
"' Id at 42.
11 Shanley & Peterson, Comparative Justice at ix-x (cited in note 59).
"7 Ivy E. Broder, Characteristics of Million Dollar Awards: Jury Verdicts and Final
Disbursements, 11 Just Sys J 349, 349-59 (1986).
"8 Mark A. Peterson reviewed post-trial action in 65 large punitive awards and found
that approximately half were reduced and the amount paid in the whole 65 was approxi-
mately half the amount awarded. Punitive Damages: Preliminary Empirical Findings, 14-
15 (Institute for Civil Justice, 1985).
1' GAO, Product Liability: Verdicts and Case Resolution in Five States at 45 (cited in
note 77).
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Is this kind of judicial control of awards a long-standing pat-
tern or an innovation? 20 None of these "attrition" studies is very
old and none looks at more than a single point in time. To provide
a crude sense of the history of these patterns, we examined a series
of ALR annotations of cases appealed on grounds of excessiveness
of the jury verdict. At intervals, ALR publishes compilations of
cases involving particular sorts of injuries. We chose annotations
about damages for non-fatal injuries to trunk and torso, head and
brain, and legs, and feet, and we computed aggregate results on all
the cases mentioned that were reported in the years 1951-53, 1961-
63, 1971-73, and 1980-83. The percentage of verdicts that remained
undisturbed by either the trial court or the appellate court rose
from 74 percent in 1951-53 and 75.9 percent in 1961-63 to 83.9 per-
cent in 1971-73 and 85.9 percent in 1981-83. Where appellate
courts did order reductions, the average size of these reductions
remained about 40 percent throughout.' 2' In other words, the per-
centage of judicially disturbed awards fell by almost half from the
two earlier sets of years to the two later sets. However, it is not
evident that this represents a withdrawal of judicial control. It
might as plausibly reflect changes in patterns of selection of cases
for publication. The different patterns for different injury catego-
ries suggest that we may be observing not a loosening, but a focus-
ing of control on larger awards. For example, disturbance of ver-
dicts involving legs/feet injuries declined from 36 percent of cases
in 1951-53 to six percent in 1981-83; but disturbance of verdicts in
"o Schnapper, 1989 Wisc L Rev 237 (cited in note 56), examined all published federal
appellate opinions for the period October 1984 to October 1985, and found that of 64 jury
verdicts challenged as excessive, reductions were ordered in 30 (47 percent). The percentage
of reductions was roughly the same in commercial, personal injury, and constitutional cases.
Id at 249. It seems likely that this overestimates the percentage of jury verdicts disturbed on
appeal, for publication of federal appellate opinions is selective and not necessarily repre-
sentative. Thus, comparison of published and unpublished opinions found that non-
affirmances were nearly three times as frequent among published opinions than among the
more numerous unpublished opinions. William L. Reynolds and William M. Richman, An
Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of
Reform, 48 U Chi L Rev 573, 617-18 (1981). Schnapper argues that the reductions he ob-
served are part of a wider pattern of increased judicial overriding of juries.. No data is
presented on judicial control of juries at any earlier point; the argument is based on changes
in Supreme Court review patterns and on the decisional propensities of Reagan-appointed
judges, who are more likely to modify and overturn jury verdicts. Schnapper, 1989 Wisc L
Rev 237.
.1 We used the following ALR notes: 11 ALR3d 9 (1967); 11 ALR3d 370 (1967); 12
ALR3d 117 (1967); 13 ALR4th 212 (1982 and Supp 1985); 14 ALR4th 328 (1982 and Supp
1985); and 16 ALR4th 238 (1982 and Supp 1985). Sections on specific sub-categories of inju-
ries such as fingers and knees were omitted. The detailed sources and computations are on
file with the author.
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(presumptively) higher-stake head/brain injuries remained
steady-22 percent in 1951-53 and 21.7 percent in 1981-83.
Most jury trials, the ICJ studies find, are probably economi-
cally justified for the parties."' That is, they are economically jus-
tified as compared to inaction or default. Whether they are cost-
,justified as compared to the last pre-trial offer, we do not know.
This comports with the finding of the Civil Litigation Research
Project, which studied a more varied population of cases, few of
which were tried, that, overall, litigation "pays" for both plaintiffs
and defendants.'"31f the cost of public facilities were added, total
costs would exceed the amount at stake in some cases. This is
sometimes taken to display the irrationality of adjudicating such
cases. Thus the Chicago Sun-Times editorialized that:
[Chief Justice Burger] offered one exceedingly good argu-
ment on behalf of dumping some civil-case juries. He said
a survey of civil cases showed the average jury trial cost
taxpayers $8,300 while half of the successful suers were
awarded less than $8,000.24
But this putative hard-headed realism ignores the possibility of
substantial party interests in the precedential or reputational re-
sults of trials. And it overlooks the wider public interest in legal
vindication and in the production of the signals and markers
broadcast by the jury. It is to these downstream effects of jury ver-
dicts that we now turn.
III. KNOWING ABOUT JURIES
The decisions of juries are most visible as resolutions of partic-
ular disputes.'25 But these dispersed responses of individual juries
do more than resolve individual disputes; collectively and cumula-
tively they influence what happens in subsequent cases. They do
this by being transmuted into a kind of knowledge about what ju-
ries are likely to do-"jury knowledge.' 26
Jury decisions shape expectations about the behavior of subse-
quent juries and thus influence settlement decisions. These effects
122 Shanley & Peterson, Comparative Justice at 75 (cited in note 59).
"23 David Trubek, et al, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L Rev 72, 109-21
(1983).
' Fair Justice at Fair Price, Chicago Sun-Times 39 (May 21, 1985).
12 More accurately, as contributions to or influences on such resolutions, since the ver-
dict may be modified by rulings of trial or appellate judges or by negotiations among the
parties.
126 See, more specifically, text accompanying notes 197-214.
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are framed by the invisible but massive influence of the jury on the
shape of the whole system of litigation. The use of the jury re-
quires a concentrated trial rather than a discontinuous one.' 7 The
tendency of American civil procedure toward diffusion into serial
proceedings-discovery, motions, pre-trial conferences, hearings,
and so forth-is limited by the exigencies of physically assembling
and insulating the jury to hold a concentrated, continuous trial.
This, in turn, radiates influence back to earlier stages of the pro-
cess. For example, since there can be no interruptions to pursue
new evidentiary leads, all potentially relevant information must be
gathered beforehand to permit uninterrupted presentation within
the fixed time frame of the continuous trial.
The presence of the trial as an uninterrupted plenary event,
requiring a closure of case development, massive commitment of
resources, and taking of risks for all actors makes it a formidable
threat, but one that is hard to use.'"8 Because this threat is costly
to carry out, its value depends on the credibility with which it can
be delivered which, in turn, varies with the prowess of counsel and
the formidability of parties.
In addition to other features of the dispute process, the jury
influences the wider arena of action in which disputes arise. Jury
verdicts are not only counters in negotiating claims; they are also
signals that affect the conduct underlying those claims-for exam-
ple, they may mobilize preventive efforts or legitimate a given level
of care. In addition to inducing prevention by inspiring recalcula-
tion of litigation risks, the flow of messages from the jury process
has more diffuse effects, partially independent of calculation about
litigation outcomes. Messages may be salient but incapable of pre-
cise reading, 1'2 9 and the effects they induce may not be reducible to
calculating re-estimation of costs and benefits, but may include
127 Arthur Taylor von Mehren, The Significance for Procedural Practice and Theory of
the Concentrated Trial: Comparative Remarks, in Norbert Horn, ed, 2 Europaisches
Rechtsdenken in Geschichte und Gegenwart 361, 364 (C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhan-
dlung, 1982).
,28 H. Lawrence Ross, Settled Out of Court: The Social Process of Insurance Claims
Adjustment 157 (Aldine Publishing, 1980). Compare Schelling's observation that threats
that cannot be "decomposed into a series of consecutive smaller threats" are harder to make
credible. Thomas C. Shelling, The Strategy of Conflict 41 (Oxford University Press, 1969).
129 Eads and Reuter found that of the various external pressures on large manufactur-
ers, product liability litigation had "the greatest influence on product design decisions," but
the signal it sent was "extremely vague." George Eads and Peter Reuter, Designing Safer
Products: Corporate Responses to Product Liability Law and Regulation viii (Institute for
Civil Justice, 1983).
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changes in moral estimation of the conduct in question.130 The va-
riety and complexity of the effects of the jury's messages awaits
systematic exploration.13'
Those cases that reach juries are a small and unrepresentative
subset of the cases disposed of in American courts. For example,
Danzon finds that the medical malpractice cases
that are actually litigated to verdict constitute a small,
atypical subset, "self-selected" to that stage of disposi-
tion precisely because the outcome was unpredictable to
the litigants, the potential award was large, and the evi-
dence for the plaintiff was weak.' 2
In other kinds of cases, the "survivors" of the settlement process
may have different distinguishing characteristics. Cases may reach
trial because one party places a premium on having an external
party make the decision, seeks to vindicate a fundamental value
commitment, or wishes to display credibility as an adversary.'
This small fraction of cases that are tried by juries not only
distribute a sizable portion of the compensation paid to plaintiffs,
but they also provide the signals and markers that influence the
"0 The complexity of the effects of judicial decisions are displayed by the reaction to
the well-known case of Tarasoff v Regents of the University of California, 13 Cal 3d 177,
529 P2d 553, 118 Cal Rptr 129 (1974), withdrawn and replaced by 17 Cal 3d 425, 551 P2d
334, 131 Cal Rptr 14 (1976). The Supreme Court of California ruled that therapists had a
duty to warn potential victims of violence threatened by their patients. Eighteen months
after its highly publicized duty to warn ruling, the court, upon reconsideration, nullified its
earlier opinion and modified the duty to one of exercising reasonable care to protect poten-
tial victims. Givelber, Bowers and Blitch surveyed therapists in 18 localities some five years
after the decision. Daniel Givelber, William Bowers and Carolyn Blitch, Tarasoff, Myth and
Reality: An Empirical Study of Private Law in Action, 1984 Wis L Rev 443. The research-
ers found that the case was widely known by therapists throughout the nation, that observa-
tion of its ruling was felt to be obligatory by most even though technically it bound only
those in California, id at 474, and "by and large the case appears to be misunderstood as
involving and requiring the warning of potential victims," id at 466 (that is, in accordance
with the withdrawn original opinion)-and to have influenced therapist responses to threat-
ening behavior toward giving warnings, initiating involuntary hospitalizations and taking
notes. Id at 481-82. A majority of respondents had translated the obligation to threatened
third parties into a requirement of professional ethics. Id at 475. The response to Tarasoff
displays the difficulties of assigning a definitive meaning to a carefully-crafted judicial opin-
ion, recorded in unchanging written form; we might think that deciphering the meaning of
an unrecorded and unexplained jury verdict is at least as formidable an undertaking.
... On the question of conceptualizing and measuring these effects, see Marc Galanter,
The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 Md L Rev 3, 39 (1986).
132 Danzon, Medical Malpractice at 51 (cited in note 48).
3I For a catalog of types of cases that manage to survive the winnowing process, see
Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and
Think We Know) About our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L Rev
4, 28-30 (1983).
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outcome of a vastly larger number of cases settled or abandoned
without trial.13' In his classic study of automobile injury settle-
ments, Ross found that "[t]he basis ...of settlements in serious
cases seems on both sides to be an estimate of the likely recovery
of the claimant before a jury .... Both sides come to this estimate
by comparing a given case in its many dimensions against other,
similar, cases, that have gone to trial." '135 Reference to jury value
was more attenuated in the evaluation of smaller, routine claims,
where potential trial was rendered improbable by the transaction
costs, but even here "the relevance of jury value [was] generally
admitted . .. ."'36
The relative importance of juries as transmitters of signals
rather than as deciders of cases seems to have increased in recent
years.137 Filings and dispositions have increased more rapidly than
jury trials.138 Against the relative stability of state jury trial levels,
there has been a dramatic increase in the number of jury trials in
the federal courts. Jury trials have increased from 2585 in 1961 to
5920 in 1988.139 But jury trials have made up a declining portion of
the total terminations of cases in federal courts. The percentage of
terminated cases reaching trial has dropped steadily from 15.2 per-
"' Jurors may occasionally be alerted to this precedential role. In the Newman case
described by Selvin and Picus, the judge "advised the jurors that he intended to apply many
of their findings from this first trial of four plaintiffs to the remaining 26." Molly Selvin and
Larry Picus, The Debate over Jury Performance: Observations from a Recent Asbestos
Case 12 (Institute for Civil Justice, 1987). But for the most part it remains unannounced. If,
when, and how much jurors ponder their precedential role remains unknown.
13 Ross, Settled Out of Court at 114-15 (cited in note 128). Ross emphasizes that "jury
value and settlement value are not the same thing," since the latter incorporates discounts
for the costs and risks avoided. In his study, it was the claimant "who yields [the] discount
for settlement." Id at 115. Ross's field work was conducted in the mid-1960s, so there is a
question of whether the patterns he reported still obtain.
"0 Id at 112. In his study of personal injury claims in New York City, Rosenthal reports
that "[tihe going values are based on prior settlements, recent jury verdicts obtained by the
attorney and his associates in similar types of cases and some rules-of-the-game, such as the
rule that a fair settlement in a strong case should not depart too greatly from a figure that
reflects the victim's out-of-pocket expenses multiplied by three." Rosenthal, Lawyer and
Client at 36 (cited in note 94).
... See, for example, Richard Lempert, More Tales of Two Courts: Exploring Changes
in the "Dispute Settlement Function" of Trial Courts, 13 L & Soc Rev 91 (1978), on the
shift in mode of court contribution to dispute settlement.
138 Indeed, the absolute number of jury trials has fallen in at least some jurisdictions.
Thus, in San Francisco, there were less than half as many jury trials in 1980-84 as in 1960-
64. In Cook County, the number of jury trials was about the same in each of the two peri-
ods. Peterson, Civil Juries in the 1980s at 6 (cited in note 74).
"' See Table 1.
[1990:-
JURY AS REGULATOR
cent in 1940 to 10.0 percent in 1970 to 4.9 percent in 1988.140 Al-
though the evidence is more spotty, there appears to be a compara-
ble relative decline in cases terminated by jury trials in state
courts.' 4 However, there are, without doubt, more trials, more rel-
evant markers and symbols, more information, and more problems
of retrieving, collating and interpreting these symbols.
This minority of tried cases casts a major part of the law's
shadow; however, the shadow is not simply the product of what
juries do. It is affected by the process of creating and communicat-
ing and extracting knowledge about what juries do. The shadow
depends on what actors-disputants, lawyers, judges, mediators,
and so forth-think juries will do. On what do they base their
opinions? Presumably, their expectations are derived in some mea-
sure from what they think juries have done and their understand-
ing of why. How are the responses-partly shrouded by se-
crecy-of a multitude of dispersed juries crystallized into usable
knowledge by these actors? In addition to a fund of personal expe-
rience with juries, an actor will have various kinds of information
about what juries have done. Such information might be crudely
divided into the following categories:
0 information about the deliberations and verdicts of
particular juries in earlier cases. This kind of informa-
tion might be gained through personal observation or
by jury verdict reports,
0 "micro" information about the propensities, percep-
tions and behavior of particular jurors. This sort of in-
formation is sometimes obtained in post-trial inter-
views with jurors,
0 "macro" information about aggregates of jury verdicts
and patterns in them. Such findings are announced by
researchers and publicists, and
* "trend" information-about the way any of these per-
sist or change over time.
"0 Administrative Office of the United Sates Courts, Annual Report 39 (1940); Admin-
istrative Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report 245a (1970); Administrative Of-
fice of the United States Courts, Annual Report 211 (1988). This includes terminations
"during or after trial," so it includes cases that settled after trial had begun.
1 See, for example, Lawrence Friedman and Robert Percival, A Tale of Two Courts:
Litigation in Alameda and San Benito Counties, 10 L & Soc Rev 267, 288 (1976); Stephen
Daniels, Continuity and Change in Patterns of Case Handling: A Case Study of Two Rural
Counties, 19 L & Soc Rev 381 (1985); Wayne McIntosh, 150 Years of Litigation and Dis-
pute Settlement: A Court Tale, 15 L & Soc Rev 823, 838-39 (1980-81). Compare Peterson,
Civil Juries in the 1980s at 6.
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Knowing about juries is not simply a matter of possessing such in-
formation. Even for the lawyer with a rich supply of such informa-
tion, predictive extrapolation is a complex interpretive
undertaking.""
Information about juries and the assumptions and theories
that inform such assessments reaches legal actors through a num-
ber of channels or media, including at least- those discussed below.
A. Personal Experience
An unpublished study by members of the Wisconsin Law Re-
view asked a cross-section of Wisconsin attorneys about the effect
of various factors on the initial monetary value each placed on his
or her most recently completed case. 143 The study suggests that an
amalgam of personal experience, checked by collegial consultation,
is the core of the evaluation process and that pursuit of systematic
information about juries is relatively uncommon. Less than half
(46.6 percent) attributed "most" or "great" effect to "knowledge of
jury verdicts in similar cases." "Extent of damages" (76.9 percent)
and "difficulties of proof/probability of success" (71.8 percent) led
the list, followed by 62.3 percent who credited "my own experience
with similar cases" with most or great effect. But the personal ex-
perience referred to is experience of "cases," not of juries. Since
only a small portion of cases are tried, the fund of experience of
settled cases is far larger than experience with tried cases. Recall
that there are roughly twice as many lawyers as there were just
twenty years ago, but there are probably not appreciably more civil
jury trials. 144 Because the profession has grown rapidly, lawyers are
on the average younger and have fewer years of experience in prac-
tice.145 We can surmise that lawyers have, per capita, less experi-
... The exigencies of interpreting jury knowledge are discussed in the text accompany-
ing notes 197-214. The discussion here focuses on lawyers, who form the majority of those
who deploy jury knowledge, but the observations that follow apply, with appropriate modifi-
cation, to other actors as well.
' Wisconsin Law Review "Going Rate" Study: Preliminary Report (on file with the
author).
.44 This is assuming that the findings in San Francisco, where jury trials declined, and
Cook County, where the number remained unchanged, are as representative as the federal
system, where they increased. This seems to be supported by the decline in the portion of
cases disposed of by trial. See notes 140-41.
"' "The median age of lawyers dropped from forty-six years in 1960 to thirty-nine
years in 1980. Lawyers under thirty-six made up 24 percent of the lawyer population in 1960
and 39 percent in 1980." Barbara A. Curran, American Lawyers in the 1980s: A Profession
in Transition, 20 L & Soc Rev 19, 23 (1986). Of all lawyers practicing in 1980, 42 percent
had been admitted after 1970. Id at 25.
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ence with jury trials as participants. (If we take our estimate""6 of
some 50,000 civil jury trials each year and make the generous as-
sumption that each jury trial engages four lawyers, every lawyer
would engage in a jury trial once in three years-if jury trials were
evenly spread among lawyers, which of course they are not. For all
but a tiny minority of lawyers, experience with juries is more medi-
ated, more indirect, more vicarious.) The shadow of the jury is
viewed less through the lenses of personal experience and more
through other media. (At the same time the personal experience of
a small minority of lawyers has been enlarged in recent years
through freer post-verdict interviewing of jurors.)
B. Oral Culture
When asked how they arrived at their initial evaluation of
their most recently resolved case, less than one-quarter of the re-
spondents to the Wisconsin Law Review survey reported using
jury verdict reports, while 70 percent relied heavily on consulta-
tions with other attorneys in their own firm. 14 7 If this reliance on
colleague consultation is at all representative, it suggests that the
major medium through which the signals of jury propensities are
transmitted remains the oral culture of the lawyers and other
"regulars." We know that this culture includes a great deal of lore
about juries and about particular kinds of jurors. We don't know
much about the way that lawyers combine this with information
from other sources.
This oral culture may be undergoing changes as the structure
of law practice changes. There are many more lawyers; as noted
earlier, they are younger and have fewer years of experience than
their predecessors of twenty-five years ago; they practice in larger
units and more of them are more specialized. Since the number of
those practicing in most localities and specialties has increased, it
seems likely that more of their encounters with opposing lawyers
are with those who are not previously known to them. We might
anticipate, then, that the oral culture would come to rely less on
implicit understandings and reference to shared experience.
14 See note 51.
117 Compare Hazel Genn, Hard Bargaining: Out of Court Settlement in Personal In-
jury Actions 75 (Clarendon Press, 1987), on how English barristers "do a quantum."
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C. Judges and Other Settlement Brokers
Many trial judges have more experience with juries than all
but a few lawyers. Over the past generation, judges have become
more active in the promotion of settlements, which has come to be
seen as a respectable and commendable part of judicial work."'8
Judges-and other court personnel such as magistrates, clerks, and
special masters" 9-have devised and adopted many innovative
techniques for promoting settlements.15 These efforts tend to be
more intense where an eventual trial would be by jury, because
judges feel more inhibited about aggressive settlement efforts
where they might end up trying the case themselves.151 Hence the
settlement discourse of judges contains considerable lore about ju-
ries. Many judges are confident that they know "what a case is
worth" and how juries will react to various features of a case.
However, judges' direct experience of civil juries may be lim-
ited. There are less than ten civil jury trials per judge annually in
the federal system, and their features vary sufficiently to render
elusive any useful generalizations. Of course, judges know about ju-
ries in other trials than the ones in which they preside. In a survey
of Wisconsin trial judges, Christopher J. Brown asked them, "How
frequently do you learn about recent jury verdicts from trial courts
other than your own, whether through publications or informal
conversations?" Only a quarter responded that they "frequently"
learned about such verdicts; half said they did "occasionally" and a
quarter said "rarely or almost never. 15 2
148 Marc Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases, 69 Judi-
cature 257, 257-62 (1986).
"' The following discussion is in terms of judges' efforts to promote settlement, but
applies with some-adaptation to these categories of intervenors as well.
10 Marc Galanter .... A Settlement Judge, not a Trial Judge: Judicial Mediation in
the United States, 12 J L & Soc 1 (1985). Data on the prevalence of judicial settlement
activities are summarized. Id at 7.
"' For example, Judge Hubert L. Will counselled newly appointed judges: "I have no
hesitation in rolling up my sleeves and going the whole way in an analysis of a jury case. I
have some reservations about non-jury cases, but, if asked by counsel to participate, I will
do so. You have to be more careful, and you have to indicate the possibility that you'll
transfer the case to another judge for trial .. " Hubert L. Will, et al, The Role of the Judge
in the Settlement Process, 75 FRD 89, 211 (1976).
1"2 This is from unpublished data made available to me by Christopher J. Brown, a
1986 graduate of the University of Wisconsin Law School. Other items in Brown's survey
inquired about judges' knowledge of the terms of settlement agreements in their own court
and in other courts. Roughly one-third of the judges reported that they learned the terms of
settlements in less than 30 percent of the settlements in their own court; another third said
they learned the terms in 30 to 60 percent of the settlements; and the final third reported
learning about the terms in more than 60 percent of the settlements. But only 12 percent of
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Lawyers seem to welcome settlement promotion by judges. A
recent poll of lawyers reported that 73 percent believe judges
should push for settlements; only 20 percent were opposed.1 3 Law-
yers with cases in the four federal districts studied by Wayne Bra-
zil overwhelmingly believe that such judicial intervention would
significantly improve the prospects for achieving settlement; they
are especially approving of judicial settlement efforts in jury mat-
ters and attribute greater effectiveness to them in that setting. 54
Intensified promotion of settlement by judges works a curious
distortion of jury signals. Over a generation ago, Harry Kalven,
noting the ability of the jury to blend conflicting considerations,
observed that "the function of the jury in the end may be not to
adjudicate the case, but, as it were, to settle it vicariously."' 5 To-
day, judges eager to promote settlements undertake to provide
what is in effect a vicarious jury verdict. This is formalized in the
curious device known as a summary jury trial, in which a group of
jurors drawn from the jury panel listens to summary presentations
by both sides and provides an advisory response.156 The summary
jury trial attempts, by cutting such corners as witnesses, to unlock
early a genuine and direct jury signal. In judicial settlement con-
ferences, on the other hand, judges often respond to comparably
incomplete presentations by proffering their reading of what a jury
might do. Such readings are based on the judge's experience, as
lawyer and judge, with juries, garnished by an admixture of "jury
knowledge" from various oral and published sources.
the judges reported that they "frequently" learned about settlement agreements in other
trial courts.
, ' Paul Reidinger, The Litigation Boom, 73 ABA J 37 (Feb 1, 1987).
W4 ayne Brazil, Settling Civil. Suits: Litigators' Views About Appropriate Roles and
Effective Techniques for Federal Judges 40, 66, 73 (American Bar Ass'n, 1985).
166 Harry Kalven, Jr., The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 10
Ohio St L J 158, 177 (1958).
" Thomas D. Lambros and Thomas H. Shunk, The Summary Jury Trial, 29 Cleve St
L Rev 43 (1980); Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative
Methods of Dispute Resolution: A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States
Committee on the Operation of the Jury System, 103 FRD 461 (1984); Thomas D. Lam-
bros, The Summary Jury Trial- An Alternative Method of Resolving Disputes, 69 Judica-
ture 286 (1986). Evaluations of results in M. Daniel Jacoubovitch and Carl M. Moore, Sum-
mary Jury Trials in the Northern District of Ohio (Federal Judicial Center, 1982); Richard
Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U Chi L Rev 366 (1986); James Alfini, et al, Summary
Jury Trials in Florida: An Empirical Assessment (Florida Dispute Resolution Center,
1989).
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D. Appellate Courts and Official Reporting
Some information about what juries do is carried in law re-
ports, typically in opinions about jury awards that were challenged
as excessive or not justifiable on the basis of the evidence. These
reports, and the legal publications summarizing and collating
them,1 7 provide a picture of what juries do in the course of
describing the leeways that trial judges and appellate courts will
allow them. Until the publication in the late 1980s of "after the
verdict" research, these materials were the principal basis for as-
certaining the relation of verdicts to actual payouts.1 58
E. Jury Verdict Reporting Services
National and local services compile and distribute information
about jury verdicts. These jury verdict reporters differ in scope,
sources, comprehensiveness, detail, frequency, and the amount of
analysis they construct. Local services approach comprehensive
coverage, e9 while the national Jury Verdict Research ("JVR") is
more selective. JVR aims to include "significant" or "important"
verdicts, and it makes "every effort to collect reliable information
on all million-dollar verdicts."1 0 This selectivity, combined with
its computational practices, means that JYR's portrayal of jury
awards emphasizes the high-end of the range.6 Presumably, these
services are used differently by various kinds of legal actors in dif-
See, for example, the ALR compilations cited in note 121.
Reported appellate cases are an incomplete source of information on post-verdict
reductions, since they give no information about trial court reductions that are not appealed
or about settlements incorporating reductions.
" Even here, there seems to be some bias toward more complete reporting of tort cases
than others. Studies based on three verdict reporters consistently display a higher portion of
tort juries than do official state statistics. See text accompanying notes 58-60. Perhaps this
reflects more user interest in tort cases, where verdicts might reveal recurrent jury propensi-
ties, than in contract cases where damages are more likely to be driven by the particulars of
the agreement in question.
,' 4 Injury Valuation: Current Award Trends 12 (Jury Verdict Research, Inc., 1986).
This is not to say that JVR collects only large verdicts. Philip J. Hermann, President of
Jury Verdict Research, Inc., reports that JVR collects sufficient data, mostly from clerks of
court, on over 24,000 of an estimated 31,000 personal injury verdicts rendered each year.
Telephone Interview with Philip J. Hermann, May 11, 1990.
' Daniels' study of jury verdicts, based on the local jury verdict services, observes that
"JVR's coverage is highly selective, reporting on what it determines to be precedent-setting
verdicts." Stephen Daniels, Civil Juries, Jury Verdict Reporters and the Going Rate 6 (Pa-
per prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the Law and Society Association, May 29
to June 1, 1986, Chicago, Illinois); A. Russell Localio, Variations on $962,258: The Misuse of
Data on Medical Malpractice, 13 L Med & Health Care 126 (1985).
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ferent kinds of cases.' 62 But we have only a few glimmerings of the
patterns of use. Ross found that jury verdict reports, routinely con-
sulted by attorneys, "were seldom used by [insurance company]
claims men [adjusters]." ' ' s Daniels notes other uses of these re-
porters: by a judge, for example, to inform pre-trial conferences; by
a lawyer to "cool out" over-optimistic clients.'"
F. Specialized Trade Media-Handbooks, Specialized Litigation
Reporters, Practitioner Journals, Continuing Education
Seminars and Other Presentations
These sources range from coverage that is more technical and
systematic than the jury verdict reporters to presentations that are
only a step removed from the informal oral culture of lawyers. One
subcategory of particular interest is the flow of information, writ-
ten and oral, along the specialized networks for information-
sharing and, sometimes, for strategic coordination that have grown
up among lawyers engaged with particular kinds of cases. Exam-
ples include the networks among plaintiffs' lawyers in asbestos,
DES and formaldehyde cases."6 '
G. Jury Consulting
In the last two decades there has been a growth of jury re-
search commissioned for use in individual cases. " This takes a
number of forms, including community surveys and focus groups
to identify favorable jurors and appealing themes for presentation;
videotaping and interviewing of jurors in mock trials; and
'' The Wisconsin Law Review study indicates that they are used more by lawyers in
smaller localities. But this may reflect smaller opportunities for colleague consultation or a
difference in the make-up of the cases.
.3 Ross, Settled Out of Court at 112 (cited in note 128). But compare reported use by
claims offices, Daniels, Civil Juries at 10.
164 Daniels, Civil Juries at 10-11.
"' See, generally, Marc Galanter, Lawyers' Litigation Networks (paper presented to
the Conference on Frontiers of Research on Litigation, Sept 20, 1985, University of Wiscon-
sin, Madison).
S166 The origin of so-called "scientific jury selection" is commonly accounted to be the
involvement of sociologist Jay Schulman in the 1972 conspiracy trial of the Berrigan broth-
ers and other Vietnam War opponents. Hans & Vidmar, Judging the Jury at 81 (cited in
note 30). Completing the circle, Schulman worked for General Westmoreland in his 1984
libel suit against CBS. Emily Couric, Jury Sleuths: In Search of the Perfect Panel, Natl L J
34 (July 21, 1986). The use of "shadow juries" dates from a 1977 IBM antitrust cases. Ste-
phen J. Adler, Consultants Dope Out the Mysteries of Jurors for Clients Being Sued, Wall
St J Al, A10 (Oct 24, 1989).
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"shadow" juries, who observe trials and are debriefed daily. 1 7
Since the use of these techniques is expensive, they are confined
mostly to sizable civil cases, but they have been used in some crim-
inal trials involving rich or visible defendants. It was recently esti-
mated that there were 300 businesses in the trial consultant
field. '68 Lawyers who use them obtain new information, of varying
quality, and presumably some of this spills back into lawyers' lore
about juries.
H. Mass Media
We should be wary of underestimating the extent to which le-
gal professionals draw on the mass media, not only for specific
items of information, but by absorbing general orientations for in-
terpreting such information. The current discourse about the liti-
gation explosion and the liability crisis, for example, displays a
complex linkage between mass media and presentations in special-
ist forums. Thus, "horror stories," often originating with profes-
sionals, are popularized by the mass media and return to be incor-
porated in discourse among professionals.6 9 Even purportedly
analytic findings may be adopted uncritically from the mass me-
dia. 7' Thus, the media may act as a filter, determining which as-
pects of legal activity languish in obscurity and which gain wide
currency and are used to interpret the legal world.' 7' Daniels
167 For a profile of these techniques and some of their practitioners, see Couric, Natl L
J 34 (July 21, 1986). For an assessment of their efficacy, see Hans & Vidmar, Judging the
Jury ch 6; Hastie, Penrod & Pennington, Inside the Jury ch 7 (cited in note 30).
' Adler, Wall St J Al (Oct 24, 1989). A year earlier it was reported that membership
of the American Society of Trial Consultants had grown to 150 from 32 in 1982. Doron P.
Levin, Social Science and the Law: The Jitry Consulting Game, NY Times 15 (July 1,
1988).
"' Compare Steven Brill and James Lyon, The Not-So-Simple Crisis, Am Lawyer 1,
12-17 (May 1986); Fred Strasser, Tort Tales: Old Stories Never Die, Natl L J 37 (Feb 16,
1987); Robert M. Hayden, The Cultural Logic of a Political Crisis: Common Sense, Hegem-
ony, and the Great American Insurance Famine of 1986 (Institute for Legal Studies, 1988).
On the role of atrocity stories in legal policy discourse, see Galanter, 31 UCLA L Rev at 64
(cited in note 133).
170 For example, a major law firm, preparing a report on the liability crisis on behalf of
a coalition of "affected organizations," provides the following evidence that "defendants are
being exposed to damage awards of increasing and unpredictable amounts":
The average verdict in both products liability and medical malpractice cases now
exceeds one million dollars, according to preliminary studies of Jury Verdict Re-
search, Inc. See Your Policy is Canceled, Time 20 (Mar 24, 1986).
Sidley & Austin, The Need for Legislative Reform of the Tort System: A Report on the
Liability Crisis from Affected Organizations 32 n 47 (May 1, 1986).
"' Thus, the media feature stories about the size of product liability judgments derived
from Jury Verdict Research, Inc., reports, but the qualifications and shortcomings of the
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points out that "[t]he media, especially the national media, and
legal elites rely on each other and on the national [jury verdict]
reporters for information. This leads to an emphasis on the un-
usual cases and those with high awards, which then are treated as
if they are representative of all cases."' 17s We should be cautious
about the ways that legal professionals are influenced by the mass
media. Like others, their general estimate of conditions will more
closely track media accounts than will their judgments in familiar
contexts.173
I. Popular Culture
Lawyers and other civil justice regulars share in the popular
culture about juries-the beliefs and expectations about juries that
circulate among non-professionals. Fed by the mass media on one
side and the lawyers' oral culture on the other, the popular legal
culture carries stories and adages about juries' role and perform-
data are omitted. Compare Localio, 13 L Med & Health Care at 126 (cited in note 161), on
the misreading of medical malpractice award data.
Daniels, Civil Juries at 17 (cited in note 161). Lawyers may be particularly suscepti-
ble to this fallacy since legal education consists of a diet of unusual cases which are taken to
be typical.
173 There is a whole tradition of research which suggests that media accounts influence
"societal level judgments" (that is, judgments about patterns and conditions in the larger
community) more strongly than they influence "personal level judgment" (that is, about the
problems and risks that face the respondent). Tom R. Tyler and Fay Lomax Cook, The
Mass Media and Judgments of Risk: Distinguishing Impact on Personal and Societal Level
Judgments, 47 J Pers & Soc Psych 693 (1984). Thus, researchers have found that concern
about crime as a public problem and personal fear of crime are often unrelated, and that
judgments about personal risk are influenced primarily by personal experience and exper-
iences conveyed through social networks, not by media reports of crime. Tom R. Tyler and
Paul J. Levrakas, Cognitions Leading to Personal and Political Behaviors: The Case of
Crime, in Sidney Kraus and Richard Perloff, eds, Mass Media and Political Thought (Sage
Publications, 1985). Reviewing the literature, Tyler concludes that "mass media reports of
crime do not appear to be an important influence on fear of crime. Instead, fear appears to
be generated primarily through personal victimization and the experiences of friends and
neighbors." Tom R. Tyler, Assessing the Risk of Crime Victimization: The Integration of
Personal Victimizaton Experience and Socially Transmitted Information, 40 J Soc Issues
27, 31 (1984). This same dissociation of social and personal levels of analysis may character-
ize the professionals who are the audience and source of mass media reports on litigation,
juries, and so forth. Perhaps it is the mark of professionals to be able to utilize the relatively
abstract "societal level" information about the world in general to form estimates of risk in
"personal level" situations.
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ance.174 It is not known how much participation in more special-
ized occupational discourse displaces these popular perceptions. 171
J. Research
Research like that of the University of Chicago Jury Project,
-psychological studies of jury decisionmaking and, recently, the re-
ports of the Institute for Civil Justice, is creating a systematic and
cumulative portrait of jury behavior. This constitutes a kind of
learning about juries that has not previously been available. We
may expect that it will feed back through specialist presentations
and mass media into the pool of knowledge employed by various
legal actors.17 1
The legal world as a whole has opened up remarkably in re-
cent years. There is a great deal more information available about
the working of legal institutions. We have enormously expanded
our knowledge of the world of American law since the period of the
University of Chicago Jury Project. We know more about litiga-
tion-about aggregate patterns, about changes over time, about
plea bargaining, about settlement, about litigants' strategies. We
know more about courts and judges-about their working routines,
about their decisionmaking, about their variability. We know more
about the world of law practice-about the work of lawyers, about
the organization of law firms, about the structure and politics of
the bar. We know more, too, about the making of regulatory policy,
about the politics of implementation, about the impact of legal reg-
ulation. Our richer and more detailed picture of law in American
society derives partly from the development of a tradition of sus-
tained, systematic, cumulative research that has been institutional-
"' For example, consider the sense of entitlement crystallized in the expression "a jury
of one's peers" or the sense of suspended judgment conveyed by "the jury's still out on
that." For some stimulating probings of popular legal culture, see Anthony Chase, Toward a
Legal Theory of Popular Culture, 1986 Wis L Rev 527; Stewart Macaulay, Images of Law in
Everyday Life: The Lessons of School, Entertainment, and Spectator Sports, 21 L & Soc
Rev 185 (1987).
' For a sense of the carryover of popular views into local legal culture, see David En-
gel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an American Com-
munity, 18 L & Soc Rev 551 (1984).
176 It is often assumed that insurers, trade associations or recurrent defendants are pos-
sessed of systematic portrayals of trends in jury behavior beyond the "public domain"
knowledge referred to in the preceding discussion. Perhaps there is some closely guarded
proprietary information of this type, but the only systematic information circulated under
insurance industry auspices are closed-claim studies. These are aggregate portraits of claims
closed and do not contain any analyses of juries. It is my sense that the findings of ICJ's
jury research were as new to insurers as to other actors in the system.
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ized in universities, research institutes, journals and scholarly as-
sociations. It also comes from the development of new modes of
legal journalism-more detailed, intrusive. investigative reporting
about law in the general press, and the emergence of a new kind of
trade press within the legal world.'77
Barriers of secrecy have fallen. Core legal activities are more
accessible-as dramatized by open meeting laws, the Freedom of
Information Act and courtroom television. The old presumptions
of confidentiality have given way to a presumption favoring free
flows of information. In the case of the jury, we find this in the
growth of the practice of permitting jurors to be interviewed after
the verdict, 7 s and the occasional court-sponsored debriefing. In
1955, after the Chicago jury researchers were censured for tape re-
cording actual jury deliberations with judicial and counsel permis-
sion, over 30 jurisdictions enacted prohibitions of "jury-tap-
ping.' 179 In contrast, the recent filming and television broadcast of
an actual jury deliberation passed with little comment. 80 Exposure
that is unremarkable now was unthinkable just a generation ago.
Everything points to overcoming the barriers that made research
with real juries forbidding.
IV. SHADOW PLAY: JURY SIGNALS AND RIVAL INFLUENCES
IN THE BARGAINING PROCESS
In visualizing the role of the jury in the litigation process, we
had recourse to familiar metaphors: the "iceberg" or pyramid of
cases, of which fully adjudicated cases form the visible peak; and
the notion that the bulk of cases are resolved by "bargaining in the
shadow" of the jury. Both images assume that the construction of
cases and the negotiation of settlements throughout the pyramid
or realm of shadows are guided by the visible stratum of authorita-
tive decisions, including those of juries. This image of hierarchic
control is typically reinforced with assumptions that legal actors
are rational, resource-maximizing decisionmakers, that they pos-
sess accurate knowledge of what juries and judges might do, and
that these expectations dominate or control their actions.' Thus,
.. See Marc Galanter, The Legal Malaise; Or, Justice Observed, 19 L & Soc Rev 537
(1985).
"0 Comment, Public Disclosures of Jury Deliberations, 96 Harv L Rev 886 (1983).
179 Kalven & Zeisel, The American Jury at vi-vii (cited in note 32).
"0 Steven Herzberg's Inside the Jury Room, broadcast on Public Broadcasting Ser-
vice's Frontline April 11, 1986.
'8 One of many possible examples of the presence of these assumptions is George L.
Priest, Measuring Legal Change, 3 J Law, Econ & Org 193 (1987).
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with adjustments for the inevitable noise and for transaction costs,
the bargaining process accurately transmits the authoritative deci-
sions in a few cases into outcomes in the vast majority of them. If
the outcomes below, reflecting as they do the decisions at the top
of the pyramid, are arbitrary or capricious, this must be because
these qualities infect the decisionmaker there, that is, the jury.
Does the process produce outcomes that are an accurate reflec-
tion of what juries would do? How much distortion is present? The
existing literature provides only a few tantalizing hints. Patricia
Danzon, who is sanguine about the rationality of actors and the
efficiency of the tort system, estimates that "[s]ome 39 to 53 per-
cent of [medical malpractice] claims that are dropped [without
payment] would in fact have won if pressed to verdict" and 23 to
43 percent of claims that received a settlement would not have won
at verdict.1 82 And this is in medical malpractice claims, which
probably command more investment in research and preparation
than almost any category of claims! Danzon presents these esti-
mates as evidence that there are stable and predictable relations
between potential verdicts and settlement outcomes. 183 The pres-
ence of false negatives and false positives on such a scale is troub-
ling. It suggests that the signals provided by verdicts are accompa-
nied by a tremendous amount of noise or are overwhelmed by
other factors.
We know very little about the process by which information
about juries is disseminated and images and beliefs formed, and
about how these interact with other factors in the settlement pro-
cess. We can supplement Danzon's aggregate analysis with several
studies that enable us to see the way that jury knowledge is used in
the evaluation of individual cases.
A provocative experiment conducted by Gerald Williams dis-
plays dramatically the complexity and variability of the process of
translating information about what juries do into assessments of
what a case is worth. Williams reports that he
obtained the cooperation of 40 practicing lawyers in Des
Moines, Iowa, who agreed to be divided into 20 pairs and
to prepare and undertake settlement negotiations in a
personal injury case. Approximately two weeks in ad-
vance of the negotiations, the attorneys were randomly
,e Danzon, Medical Malpractice at 50 (cited in note 48). Compare id at 43. The deriva-
tion of these estimates is explained in Patricia Danzon and Lee Lillard, The Resolution of
Medical Malpractice Claims: Modeling and Analysis 47 (RAND Corp., 1982).
"' Danzon, Medical Malpractice at 50.
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assigned to represent either the plaintiff or the defendant
(as counsel for the insurance company). Attorneys as-
signed to represent the plaintiff were given identical case
files, as were attorneys assigned to the defense. Under
the facts, it was assumed the case arose in Iowa, Iowa law
applied, and if the case went to trial it would be tried to
a jury in Des Moines, Iowa. To assure comparability of
predicted jury awards, photocopies of comparable jury
awards from the Des Moines area were included in the
case files for both sides, [and] participating lawyers were
informed that results of the negotiations would be pub-
lished, with attorney names attached, among the partici-
pants at the workshop. This meant the attorneys had
their professional reputations riding on the outcomes.18
After the attorneys negotiated their settlements, 14 of the 20
pairs were willing to submit a signed statement of results. Williams
gives us the results in a striking table.
RESULTS OF WILLIAMS' EXPERIMENTAL NEGOTIATION AMONG DES
MOINES ATTORNEYS
Attorney
Pair
Plaintiff's
Opening
Demand
Defendant's
Opening
Demand
Settlement
$ 32,000
$ 50,000
$675,000
$110,000
Not reported
$100,000
$475,000
$180,000
$210,000
$350,000
$ 87,500
$175,000
$ 97,000
$100,000
$10,000
$25,000
$32,150
$ 3,000
Not reported
$ 5,000
$15,000
$40,000
$17,000
$48,500
$15,000
$50,000
$10,000
Average settlement
$18,000
no settlement
$95,000
$25,120
$15,000
$25,000
no settlement
$80,000
$87,000
$61,000
$30,000
no settlement:
narrowed to
$137,000-$77,000
$57,500
$56,875
$47,818
Source: Williams, Legal Negotiation at 7.
184 Gerald R. Williams, Legal Negotiation and Settlement 6 (West, 1983) (emphasis
added).
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Both demands and outcomes ranged widely among these ex-
perienced lawyers who were equipped with the same information
about jury verdicts. Although one can imagine various threats to
the validity of these results, for example, sampling bias or varying
amounts of experience with personal injury cases, they neverthe-
less strongly suggest that information about what juries have done
in "comparable cases" interacts with other factors to produce great
variation in lawyers' responses to a case. 85
The prominence of colleague consultation in the case evalua-
tion process 1 6 suggests one possible explanation for the high varia-
tion found in Williams' Des Moines experiment. If we assume that
Des Moines lawyers are like those in Wisconsin and consult col-
leagues in deciding what a case is worth, we might guess that while
Williams' subjects conscientiously applied themselves to the file,
they might have curtailed the usual practice of consultation, de-
clining to burden colleagues with a simulation. If so, the situation
involved a shift for many participants from colleague consultation
to jury verdict reports as a basis for valuation. Could it be that the
former would generate greater consensus on valuation than the
latter?
Another important element is missing in the Williams' simula-
tion: the alternative of the trial. In the real-life bargaining situa-
tion, the alternative to successful settlement negotiations is a trial,
viewed by most lawyers most of the time as a costly, risky, disrup-
tive and onerous undertaking. In the simulation, the risk of this
outcome was absent. The only "penalty" for failure to settle was a
possible and marginal loss-of-face before the researcher. We might
expect that with the sanction for failure thus reduced, many law-
yers would incline to act more "optimistically," exposing them-
selves to greater risk of disagreement than where the situation con-
tained real sanctions for failure to agree. The "trial as the
alternative" element was very much present in an early 1960s
study of 443 back and neck injury verdicts, reported by Philip
Hermann, that compared the verdicts with the final demands and
offers of plaintiffs and defendants. Only one-sixth of the demands
and offers fell within 25 percent of the verdict. Hermann concludes
'1 It also suggests a neat little experiment to measure the impact of these reports:
imagine an experimental "duplicate bridge" negotiation like Williams', but with the infor-
mation on the previous juries varied among the participants.
,' See text accompanying note 147.
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that "the guessing is equally wild on the part of both attorneys and
the insurance companies.' 1
87
Douglas Rosenthal's analysis of the settlement of personal in-
jury cases in New York in the 1960s retains the "same case" qual-
ity of the simulation, while providing a "realistic" context and
comparison with the "real world" outcome. A panel of five experts
were asked to estimate what each of 59 actual settled cases was
worth in terms of settlement at 'various stages and jury award. 188
Panelists tended to agree about the relative value of the cases. But
Rosenthal observed that "[t]he considerable variation among pan-
elists with respect to each case does not accord with the wide-
spread assumption that experts will tend to reach a consensus on
the value of any particular case."189 The panel average was then
compared to the actual settlement. Actual settlements ranged from
more than twice the panel consensus to just one-sixth of it. The
median recovery was about 75 percent of the panel evaluation for
the corresponding stage. 90 About 40 percent of recoveries were for
less than 60 percent of the panel valuation. 191
What are we to make of this persistant and sizable variability
and error in lawyers' readings of potential outcomes? Is it the re-
sult of the capriciousness of juries? Or are there problems in the
formation and use of knowledge about juries? Or do the sources of
error lie outside juries in other features of the litigation process?
A. Jury Variation and Capriciousness
Contemporary critics of the jury blame this disarray on the
capriciousness and unpredictability of the jury.'92 If outcomes are
arbitrary or capricious, this must be because these qualities infect
the jury. The Institute for Civil Justice studies, Danzon, and other
studies, however, provide evidence of massive stability and consis-
tency in jury decisionmaking. This is particularly impressive in
view of the changes in the composition of juries over the past gen-
eration-by the expansion of jury rolls to include more women and
minorities, and by the restrictions on automatic or easy excusal for
187 Philip J. Hermann, Predicting Verdicts in Personal Injury Cases, 475 Insur L J 505
(1962).
188 The makeup of the panel and the method of securing evaluations are described by
Rosenthal, Lawyer and Client at 202-07 (cited in note 94).
.8 Id at 202.
180 Id at 38.
18, Id at 207.
... See examples in text accompanying notes 35-38.
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various occupational groups. 19 3 Yet there is a widespread percep-
tion that juries are less stable and predictable than they once were.
Unlike many such perceptions of decline, this one may have some
foundation. It may be that jury stability has been compromised by
the innovation of using smaller juries and less demanding decision
rules, 19 practices guaranteed to produce greater variability in jury
verdicts. 95 Although there is some uncertainty about the magni-
tude of such effects, it may well be that it is sufficient to aggravate
the sense of unpredictability and danger that besets players in the
liability game."
B. The Nature and Use of Jury Knowledge
Even complete and accurate information about what juries
have done would be very difficult to apply, since everything de-
pends on judgments of similarity and difference in the cases and
estimates of the range of jury variation in responding to them. In
fact, the information received through the various channels is in-
complete, conflicting, and of very mixed quality. And the daunting
task of interpretation is rendered especially perilous by a number
of features of the setting in which this information is generated
and used.
The literature of cognitive psychology catalogs a number of
factors that lead to biased inferences and judgments about uncer-
tain events.1 97 For example, decisionmakers often ignore relevant
"' Hans & Vidmar, Judging the Jury ch 4 (cited in note 30).
191 On the shift to smaller juries and non-unanimity rules, see text accompanying notes
33 and 34.
" Hans Zeisel.... And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury,
38 U Chi L Rev 710 (1971); Hans Zeisel and Shari S. Diamond, 'Convincing Empirical Evi-
dence' on the Six Member Jury, 41 U Chi L Rev 281 (1974). Zeisel's analysis is qualified
and extended by Lempert, who agrees that "[tihe decisions of twelve-person juries are likely
to be more consistent across similar cases, and are more representative of the community in
that they are more likely to reflect the decisions that would prevail if the entire community
could judge the trial for itself." Richard Lempert, Uncovering 'Nondiscernible' Differences:
Empirical Research and the Jury-Size Cases, 73 Mich L Rev 644, 679 (1975). A recent
commentator thinks the decline in jury size is the "best explanation" of increased variability
of jury awards. Michael J. Saks, In Search of the "Lawsuit Crisis", 14 L Med & Health Care
77, 79 (1986).
,,' See text accompanying note 35.
,97 Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of
Social Judgment (Prentice-Hall, 1980); Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Availability:
A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 Cognitive Psych 207 (1973); Amos
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, 76 Psych Bulletin 105
(1971); Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Rep-
resentativeness, 3 Cognitive Psych 430 (1972); Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, On
the Psychology of Prediction, 80 Psych Rev 237 (1973). Much of this literature is usefully
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baseline information, misattributing representativeness to data.
The frequency of easily remembered events is exaggerated, leading
to overestimation of risk from publicized hazards relative to less
visible ones.19 8 "Vivid information, that is, concrete, sensory and
personally relevant information, may have a disproportionate im-
pact on beliefs and inferences." 191 Furthermore, biased receptive-
ness to confirming evidence makes people excessively confident in
the accuracy of their knowledge.2" It has been suggested that these
cognitive infirmities afflict juries' °  and judges, as well.2 02 They
seem especially applicable to the users of jury knowledge, who
draw conclusions about the characteristics of large populations on
the basis of incomplete and biased samples.
Using jury knowledge is a complex interpretive undertaking,
involving assessments of the comparability of earlier and later
cases, of the location of specific verdicts along the range of expect-
able jury responses, and of the scope, slope and speed of trends in
jury behavior. It is an undertaking ideally suited for the appear-
ance of the kinds of flawed "intuitive" judgment described in the
cognitive-psychology literature. Even those in possession of a great
deal of accurate information may make spurious inferences about
the patterns of jury response.20 3 The setting in which jury knowl-
edge is used lacks some of the checks that might minimize these
cognitive slips. "Bargaining in the shadow" of jury verdicts in-
volves constant estimates of imponderables, and only intermittent
opportunities for feedback to check the accuracy of these
estimates.
Law and economics scholars liken litigation decisions to in-
vestment decisions, such asithe decision to purchase or sell stock,
the accuracy of which can be checked against changes in the mar-
ket price. Because most cases end in settlement, however, the accu-
assessed in Elizabeth Loftus and Lee Roy Beach, Human Inference and Judgment: Is the
Glass Half Empty or Half Full?, 34 Stan L Rev 938 (1982).
19 Loftus & Beach, 34 Stan L Rev at 944-45.
199 Nisbett & Ross, Human Inference at 190.
200 Loftus & Beach, 34 Stan L Rev at 946.
201 Selvin & Picus, The Debate over Jury Performance at 46 (cited in note 134); Loftus
& Beach, 34 Stan L Rev at 946.
202 Troyen A. Brennan and Robert F. Carter, Legal and Scientific Probability of Cau-
sation of Cancer and Other Environmental Disease in Individuals, 10 J Health, Politics,
Policy & L 33, 54 (1985).
210 Thus, Chin and Peterson envision litigants basing tactical decisions on "apparent
associations between verdicts and litigant-types" where observed "patterns may be ex-
plained by other case features .. " Chin & Peterson, Deep Pockets, Empty Pockets at 32
(cited in note 66).
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racy of the great majority of readings by actors are never tested.
Like the participants in Williams' mock negotiations, each negotia-
tor can go away thinking that he or she performed well-an im-
pression that other actors have a strategic interest in fostering.
The opportunities for learning are quite skewed. Lawyers' esti-
mates that are excessively favorable to their own clients would be
expected to encounter challenge and testing more often than esti-
mates that were too "pessimistic.""2 ° Hence lawyers typically expe-
rience "correction" only at the optimistic end of the scale.20 Be-
cause the feedback is biased, the accumulation of experience does
not improve the accuracy of the readings.
20 6
The distortions that result from the micro-politics of settle-
ment interact with distortions that result from the social organiza-
tion of jury knowledge. A number of mutually reinforcing factors
conspire to institutionalize the overestimation of jury awards.
Plaintiffs' lawyers exaggerate the size of claims for tactical and
promotional purposes-especially in tort cases. Recoveries are only
a fraction of demands.20 7 Large demands are newsworthy-as are
large verdicts-but plaintiff losses and reductions of awards are
rarely news. Widely-circulated horror stories recount, with ficti-
204 The situation of negotiators is a mirror image of that of teachers, who are challenged
when they grade with unexpected severity, but arouse no corrective response when they
grade with unexpected generosity.
"I Compare Williams' finding, based on a study of Denver and Phoenix attorneys, that
the prevalent negotiating style (65 percent of his respondents) is a cooperative rather than
an aggressively competitive one; so that opportunities for testing "optimistic" claims are
reduced. Williams, Legal Negotiations and Settlement at 19 (cited in note 184).
206 Compare Loftus & Beach, 34 Stan L Rev at 955 (cited in note 197). This bias is one
example of a general lack of feedback in settlement behavior, which in turn is one part of a
problem of quality control. Concern in recent years about lawyers' competence in the court-
room has eclipsed the question of their performance as negotiators. Unlike the courtroom,
where performance is subject to controls and sanctions as well as observation and compari-
son, negotiation is unregulated and largely invisible. On the failure of the Kutak Commis-
sion's attempt to include standards of negotiating behavior in the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, compare § 4 of the Discussion Draft of Janaury 30, 1980, with the
counterpart sections of the Rules as they emerged in the ABA Rules of Professional Con-
duct, adopted August 2, 1983. See, generally, Geoffrey C. Hazard, The Lawyer's Obligation
to Be Trustworthy When Dealing with Opposing Parties, 33 SC L Rev 181, 191-95 (1981);
Gerald Clark, Fear and Loathing in New Orleans: The Sorry Fate of the Kutak Commis-
sion's Rules, 17 Suffolk U L Rev 79, 89 (1983).
207 Over a 90 year period in two Massachusetts counties, recoveries amounted to about
one-quarter of the ad damnum-only 15 percent in tort cases, the yield declining over time.
Michael S. Hindus, et al, The Files of the Massachusetts Superior Court, 1859-1959 149
(G.K. Hall, 1979). For instance, Silverman found of Boston courts in the late 19th century:
"the sum recovered rarely equaled more than 10 percent of the ad damnum." Robert A.
Silverman, Law and Urban Growth: Civil Litigation in the Boston Trial Courts, 1880-1900
115 (Princeton University Press, 1981).
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tious embellishments, ludicrous claims and outlandishly large
awards.2 08 The appetite for tales of stonewalling resistance and
Scrooge-like offers is less developed. Stephen Daniels found that
the national jury verdict reporters tended to replicate and feed the
bias of the popular press:
All are highly selective and the picture they present is
biased toward the unusual situation and the large award
(the ones that attract attention); and for some ... there
is a very real plaintiff victory bias because of the reliance
on . . . lawyer self reporting of cases. '209
Rosenthal's findings suggest that even experienced specialist-
lawyers tend to overestimate recoveries.21 0
Skewed feedback and media bias interact. Thus, the head of
Jury Verdict Research, a former personal injury defense lawyer
observed:
Representing insurance carriers, it has always surprised
me how the evaluations of value of similar injury claims
varied so widely among different companies, even for
claims which they see with frequency, such as cervical
strain. Of course, all claim executives believe their evalu-
ations are sound because they have been evaluating
claims for many years. Their "experience" may be simply
repeating the same evaluation philosophy-often far
from the reality of what juries are really awarding. Un-
fortunately for their companies, they often believe that
juries award larger verdicts than they really do. I am con-
tinually amazed at the numerous settlements for far
greater amounts than could be reasonably expected for a
similar case by a jury.... It is obvious that the insurance
carrier's representatives were influenced by the high ver-
dict awards reported by the news media. 1
'on For a discussion, see Robert M. Hayden, The Cultural Logic of a Political Crisis:
Common Sense, Hegemony and the Great American Insurance Famine of 1986 (Institute
for Legal Studies, 1988). See also Brill & Lyons, Am Lawyer 1 (May 1986) (cited in note
169).
... Daniels, Civil Juries at 14 (cited in note 161). Compare Localio, 13 L Med & Health
Care at 126-29 (cited in note 161). Compare the assertion that the English counterpart,
Current Law, is "low on damages" because of selective reporting by insurance companies.
Genn, Hard Bargaining at 77 (cited in note 147).
210 Discussed in text accompanying notes 190-91.
Philip J. Hermann, Report to the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the
[United States House of Representatives] Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Af-
fairs, in HR 241.15.4, Part I Liability Insurance Crisis 22-23 (Aug 6, 1986).
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Just how these various distortive forces play out may be
changing. As the structures of professional life are altered, the
sources of information about juries are changing. With fewer jury
trials relative to the number of cases and to the number of lawyers,
lawyers have less direct personal experience with juries; new chan-
nels of information proliferate, making available a flow of informa-
tion that is both richer and harder to interpret. Improved educa-
tion, greater specialization, the nationalization of law practice, the
upgrading of the plaintiffs' bar, all change the ways in which this
information is processed. The arrival of voluminous and detailed
systematic research on juries means that there is both more "good"
and "bad" jury information around. Lawyers now must add skill in
doping-out research to skill in doping-out juries.
If jury signals are so hard to read and decode, would not jus-
tice be better served by a process that gave stronger and clearer
signals, for example, by professional decisionmakers whose deci-
sions could be accompanied by generalizable explanations? This
assumes that the cognitive disarray besetting jury knowledge is
due to the fact that the signals are broadcast by juries. But several
studies of settings where the decisionmakers are not juries, but
judges, cast some doubt on this.
Studies of personal injury settlements in England, for exam-
ple, where there are no juries in such cases, portray a process per-
vaded by a sense of uncertainty about what judges will do.212 In a
revealing American study, Melli, Erlanger and Chambliss con-
ducted in-depth interviews with 30 lawyers involved in 25 settled
cases of divorce involving minor children in Dane County, Wiscon-
sin. Regarding child support and property division,
A number of the lawyers we interviewed acknowledge
that they have difficulty in explaining court standards
and that they cannot predict the outcomes of court
processes.... Among the lawyers in our sample who do
think that there are set standards, and who do say they
can predict outcomes, there are differences of opinion as
to the content of those standards. Different lawyers cite
... Donald Harris, et al, Compensation and Support for Illness and Injury 98 (Claren-
don Press, 1984). Genn found that 89 percent of the solicitors in her survey agreed that it is
difficult to predict how much a judge will award to a successful plaintiff. Genn, Hard Bar-
gaining at 75.
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different "court standards": obviously, they cannot all be
correct. '13
It appears that unclear signals about outcome can flourish in the
absence of the jury, when decisions are entirely in the hands of
professionals.""
Although the way the jury's signals affect the settlement pro-
cess must be explored further, my sense is that it is not adequately
captured by the "pyramid" or "iceberg" images, with their conno-
tation of orderly bonds of rational calculation by which the "visible
cap" of jury verdicts "controls" the larger settlement arena. Rather
than a symmetrical and comprehensible crystalline structure, we
find indistinct and distorted signals that are often lost or misread.
The disorienting experience of unpredictability that disturbs the
jury's critics may have its major sources not in the incompetence
and bias of the jury, nor even in the infirmities of knowledge about
the jury, but in the settlement process itself.
C. Extra-Jury Features of the Litigation Process
The discrepancy of results and panel estimations in Rosen-
thal's study" 5 might be read as suggesting that the outcome of the
case was determined by factors other than those taken into ac-
count by the panel-in particular by the relative capability of the
parties to play the litigation game." 6 Thus, Rosenthal himself
found that the settlement outcome was strongly affected by how
213 Howard S. Erlanger, et al, Cooperation or Coercion: Informal Settlement in the
Divorce Court 29-30 (Institute for Legal Studies, 1986). In interpreting this and other find-
ings of this research team, it is important to remember that the research was conducted in a
setting in which virtually all lawyers handle divorces and there are few specialists.
2' This indeterminacy of authoritative decisionmaking may not always be entirely un-
welcome to those who negotiate in its shadow. Austin Sarat and William F. Felstiner, Law
and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 L & Soc Rev 93 (1986), observing interac-
tions between divorce lawyers and clients in two settings, found lawyers utilizing the uncer-
tainties of the legal system to dampen client expectations, to avoid clients who seek predic-
tion and certainty and to portray cynically the legal process as pervaded by "human
frailties, contradictions between appearance and reality, carelessness, incoherence, accident,
and built-in limitations." Id at 108. By creating doubt about the result, the lawyer succeeds
in dampening client expectations, averting blame for disappointments, and making the cli-
ent more malleable in negotiations and focused on what the lawyer can deliver.
1I Rosenthal conducted a detailed study of 57 personal injury cases, in which he con-
cluded "[tihe more a claim is worth the less favorable the recovery is likely to be.... The
smaller the claim, the better the chances for a fair return." Douglas Rosenthal, Lawyer and
Client: Who's in Charge? 78, 206 (Russell Sage Foundation, 1974).
210 It might also be taken as evidence that the expert panel was unrepresentative of the
range of estimates in the local legal community-that is, that existing signals would be read
differently by other lawyers.
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"active" the client was-a feature reflected only dimly in the infor-
mation available to the panel.2 17 This comports with findings of
other studies that outcomes are affected by the relative capability
of the parties as disputants.21 Thus, Ross also found that repre-
sented accident claimants recovered more than unrepresented
ones, and those represented by specialists recovered still more.219
But lawyer specialization is not the only characteristic that made a
difference. Melli, Erlanger and Chambliss found that the level of
child support provided in settlement agreements is affected by the
relative reluctance or impatience of the divorcing parties.2
Beyond disparities in party capability, more general features
of the litigation process may act to muffle the effect of jury signals.
Increases in two notable and interconnected sets of such features,
legal uncertainty and transaction costs, have in turn enlarged the
settlement ranges and further undermined the integrity of the sig-
nalling system.
D. Legal Uncertainty
Growth in the scale and complexity of the legal system is ac-
companied by increased indeterminacy. Increases in the number
and variety of legal actors, in the number of decisionmakers, in the
amount and scope of authoritative material, in the span of legal
theory, in the amount and kinds of available information, in ex-
27 Rosenthal developed an index of client activeness based on which clients sought
quality medical attention, expressed special wants or concerns, made follow-up demands for
attention and seeking second legal opinions. Rosenthal, Lawyer and Client at 30-33.
218 On the party capability notion as explaining patterns of litigation, see Galanter, Ad-
judication, Litigation and Related Phenomena (cited in note 109).
21' Ross, Settled Out of Court at 197-98 (cited in note 128). Assuming that the mem-
bers of Rosenthal's panel of experts were specialists, they may have accurately reflected how
the cases would have fared in the hands of their peers, but overestimated what they would
bring in the hands of non-specialist lawyers.
220 They found that,
for impatient custodial mothers and reluctant supporting fathers, child support
tended to comprise a lower than average percent of father's income; conversely,
for impatient supporting fathers and reluctant custodial mothers, the percent of
father's income paid in child support was higher than average.
.... The role of impatience and reluctance in shaping the amount of the
award is illustrated most graphically by comparing mean awards. The mean award
for two children was 23 percent of the supporter's income. However, in the seven
cases where the supporting parent was reluctant or the custodial parent impatient,
the mean award was 19 percent of father's income; in the five cases where the
custodian was reluctant or the supporting parent impatient, the mean award was
29 percent of father's income.
Marygold S. Melli, et al, The Process of Negotiation: An Exploratory Investigation in the
Divorce Court 34-35 (Institute for Legal Studies, 1985).
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penditures for legal services and the consequent intensity of lawyer
work 2'2-all of these multiply the opportunities, incentives and re-
sources for unforeseen juxtaposition and innovative enterprise to
undermine established theories, rules and practices. Contingency
and discretion increase as rules and institutions grow in bulk and
complexity. Mirjan Damaska observed that "there is a point be-
yond which increased complexity of law, especially in loosely or-
dered normative systems, objectively increases rather than de-
creases the decisionmaker's freedom. Contradictory views can
plausibly be held, and support found for almost any position."'
Anthony d'Amato presented a striking analysis of actors' incen-
tives that support an inherent entropic tendency of legal rules
within our complex legal system to become "increasingly vague, in-
applicable, remote, ambiguous or exception-ridden.""22 In a recent
book, Ethan Katsh argued that these processes are accelerated by
the shift from print to electronic media for storing and retrieving
legal information.224
E. Increase in Transaction Costs
As the society becomes richer, the stakes in disputes become
higher, and there are more organizations and individuals that can
make greater investments in litigation. Expenditures on one side
produce costs on the other. Again, as the law becomes more volu-
minous, more complex, and more uncertain, costs increase. Virtu-
ally every "improvement" in adjudication-refinements of due pro-
cess that require more submissions, hearings, and findings;
elaborations of the law that require research, investigation and evi-
dence; provision of additional services by specialized ex-
perts-increases the need and opportunity for greater expendi-
tures. As transaction costs-time, resources, uncertainty about
recovery and its amount-rise, there is more chance of overlap in
the bargaining position of the parties. That is, there is a greater
"settlement range" in which both parties are better off than in
.. The growth of these and other dimensions of the legal world over the past genera-
tion are described in Marc Galanter and Thomas Palay, Tournament of Lawyers: the
Growth and Transformation of the Large Law Firm ch 4 (forthcoming, University of Chi-
cago Press, 1991).
.2. Mirjan Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84
Yale L J 480 (1975). See also Malcolm M. Feeley, The Concept of Laws in Social Science: A
Critique and Notes on an Expanded View, 10 L & Soc Rev 497, 500 (1976).
Anthony d'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 Cal L Rev 1, 4 (1983).
,' Ethan Katsh, The Electronic Media and the Transformation of Law 43-46 (Oxford
University Press, 1989).
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running the full course of adjudication.'" As settlement ranges are
extended, actors face the problem of how to reach agreement
within the settlement range.2" The recent proliferation of settle-
ment brokers (judges, mediators, special masters) and devices
(mini-trials and summary jury trials, for example) testifies to the
increasing demand for signals to identify points of convergence
within the broad settlement ranges created by higher transaction
costs.
Like the "pyramid" or "iceberg" image, the "bargaining in the
shadow" metaphor, although admitting the possibility of system-
atic distortion, also conveys an image of hierarchic control in which
settlements are guided by the rulings of authoritative decision-
makers. But Melli and her collaborators found that in the divorce
arena, there is a
question of who is in fact casting the shadow of the law.
The expectation of what a particular judge would set for
child support had to be determined from the cases in his
or her court-most of which involved settlements. The
shadow of the law, therefore, was cast by the agreements
of the parties. It seems that, rather than a system of bar-
gaining in the shadow of the law, divorce may well be one
of adjudication in the shadow of bargaining.22
82 For example, if a plaintiff believes his claim is worth $1 million and it will cost
$200,000 to achieve it, any settlement over $800,000 leaves him better off than a verdict for
$1 million (putting aside uncertainty for the moment, which would lower the settlement
point further). Similarly, a defendant who anticipated a $1 million judgment and $200,000
expenses in the course of defending the case would regard any settlement below $1,200,000
as preferable. The settlement range is roughly from $800,001 to $1,199,999. At any point
over this range, both parties are better off settling than going to verdict. If the transaction
costs of the parties rise-for example to $400,000 each, the settlement range increases ac-
cordingly-in our example from $600,001 to $1,399,999.
'2 This is an instance of dividing the "exchange surplus"-the "total gain in utility
perceived by the two parties from the exchange itself as compared to not trading." Ian Mac-
Neil, The New Social Contract: An Inquiry Into Modern Contractual Relations 130 n 19
(Yale University Press, 1980). But since settlements are exchanges under conditions of bilat-
eral monopoly-plaintiff is the only plaintiff with whom defendant can deal and vice
versa-the normal availability of alternative trading partners is absent so markets cannot be
relied upon to produce evenness or mutuality in the division of the exchange surplus.
227 Melli, et al, The Process of Negotiation at 12 (cited in note 220). Erlanger suggests
than an "argument could be made that.., judges may be following the patterns they'see in
informal settlements, rather than the other way around; and instead of 'bargaining in the
shadow of the law,' we should refer to 'litigating in the shadow of informal settlement.'"
Erlanger, Cooperation or Coercion at 31 (cited in note 213).
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CONCLUSION
The official picture of our litigation system is of expert profes-
sionals applying authoritative learning to adjudicate controversies
in accordance with a pre-existing body of rules and formal proce-
dures. Professional expertise is tempered by juries-a qualification
justified on grounds of equality and participation. In actual opera-
tion, the system incorporates numerous departures from this
model of formal professional justice. Alongside the imposition of
binding decisions by professional judges and transient juries, we
find, in vastly greater amount; negotiation by partisan actors and
mediation by judges, commonly giving weight to a host of strategic
considerations in addition to legal entitlements. The regulars de-
velop understandings and priorities that apply, modify, supple-
ment and sometimes displace formal legal norms.22 Melli provides
a striking example of the ostensibly central and independent for-
mal'process of adjudicative decisionmaking becoming subordinated
to the penumbral process of bargaining that surrounds it. Another
example is provided by Judith Resnik's analysis of the prevalence
of consent decrees in which judges in effect delegate judicial power
to the negotiators before the bench.2 2
In a setting where judges are increasingly enmeshed in the
bargaining process and increasingly imbued with managerial and
programmatic perspectives,2 30 the transience and amateurism of
the jury may turn out to have important and unsuspected virtues.
The amateurism of the jury has often been scorned as a blemish on
legal rationality. Thus a Harvard. Law School dean observed that
[j]ury trial, at best, is the apotheosis of the amateur.
Why should anyone think, that twelve people brought in
from the street, selected in various ways, for their lack of
general ability, should have any special capacity to de-
cide controversies between persons?3 1
The jury is "lay" or "amateur" in two senses. First, it is not made
up of professionals or experts who possess special knowledge of le-
22 On the presence of such "local legal cultures," see note 109 and accompanying text.
Judith Resnik, Judging Consent, 1987 U Chi Legal F 43.
3. On the managerial perspective, see id: On the contrast between programmatic and
case-by-case perspectives as a element of judicial style, see Marc Galanter, Frank S. Palen
and John M. Thomas, The Crusading Judge: Judicial Activism in Urban Trial Courts, 52 S
Cal L Rev 699 (1979).
"I Ervin Griswold, 1962-63 Harvard Law School Dean's Report 5-6.
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gal norms or their application. 2 ' Second, jurors don't decide cases
for a living-they are transients, who remain citizens rather than
workers in the litigation shop-and they don't do it recurrently or
often. 3 '
The costs and benefits of the first aspect, absence of profes-
sional expertise, have been addressed by a body of research on jury
decisionmaking; and it turns out that juries are reasonably good
deciders of disputes.213 What of the jury's transient and episodic
character? If juries introduce community perspectives, they do not
do so as the carriers of a rival popular legal culture. Judges and
lawyers have access to a tradition of law. Cases for them are part
of a literary tradition that may be consulted. These professionals
have enduring, patterned, reciprocal relations with other actors
who may enforce on them the expectation of consulting that tradi-
tion. Jurors, however, have neither a communicated tradition of
work to draw on2"' nor a web of patterned reciprocal relations with
other actors in the system. The absence of continuity and trans-
mission from one jury to the next may be a strength as well as a
weakness. The jury does not bec6me jaded or lapse into the typifi-
cations and routines that the regulars develop.236 Their transient,
2 See, for example, Comment, A More Rational Approach to Complex Civil Litiga-
tion in the Federal Courts: The Special Jury, 1990 U Chi Legal F 575.
233 In earlier eras juries may have lacked this second type of amateurism. Describing
jury practice at the Old Bailey from 1675 to 1735, Langbein reports that juries tried scores
of cases, often deliberating on them in batches, and typically included many veteran jurors.
John Langbein, The Criminal Trial before the Lawyers, 45 U Chi L Rev 263, 274-77 (1978).
23. See materials cited in note 32 and general discussion in note 73.
28 But compare Kalven & Zeisel, The American Jury at 219 (cited in note 32), who
often seem to attribute to juries a kind of West System of jury sentiments and dispositions
on which jurors can draw.
"' The tendency of regular actors to gravitate into such typifications and routines has
been documented in civil (see, for example, Ross, Settled Out of Court at 134-35 (cited in
note 128)) as well as criminal matters (see, for example, David Sudnow, Normal Crimes:
Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public Defender's Office, 12 Soc Prob 255
(1965); Lynn M. Mather, Some Determinants of the Method of Case Disposition: Decision-
Making by Public Defenders in Los Angeles, 8 L & Soc Rev 187 (1973)). G.K. Chesterton
endorsed juries for the reason that
the horrible thing about all legal officials, 'even the best, about all judges, magis-
trates, barristers, detectives, and policemen, is not that they are wicked . . . not
that they are stupid ... it is simply that they have got used to it .... They do not
see the awful court of judgment; they only see their own workshop.
Gilbert K. Chesterton, The Twelve Men, in Tremendous Trifles 56 (Dufour Editions, 1968).
I am indebted to Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson, A View from the Other Side of the Bench,
69 Marq L Rev 463 (1986), for this quotation. Compare Borucka-Arctowa's description of
the lay judge in Poland as "conceived as a means of preventing, or counter-balancing, a
certain tendency toward the routine, a professional deformation inevitable in the perform-
ance of various professional functions, to which the judge is subject as well." Maria
Borucka-Arctowa, Citizen Participation in the Administration of Justice: Reasearch and
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intermittent character liberates juries to depart from the under-
standings of the regulars. Unlike those vocationally committed to a
role in the system, the jury has no informal relations to be main-
tained nor any shared patterns of accommodating the law to other
commitments.2 37 The jury's individualized responses and fresh in-
puts, impervious to precedent and knowing expectations, preserve
the decision process from being swallowed by the surrounding bar-
gaining process. The jury can keep the litigation process anchored
in the emergent moral sense of the society.
Most cases will continue to be resolved in the jury's shadow
rather than by the jury itself. But some shadows are more distinct,
readable and current than others. Just as the decisions of profes-
sionals may be degraded, so may the currency of jury decisions be
debased. In considering the future of the jury, we must think of it
not only as a decider of disputes, but as the producer of signals for
the operation of the system of settlements. Protection of the integ-
rity of the jury's signals involves action on three levels. First, it
suggests policies to improve the quality of jury decisionmaking, for
example, by such measures as allowing note-taking and question-
ing, and reducing its variability, by retaining or restoring large ju-
ries and strict decision rules.2 38 Second, it suggests the necessity of
upgrading the quality of jury knowledge and the skills of actors in
interpreting it. Third, it suggests the need to explore the bargain-
ing process for ways to offset the influence of extra-jury factors
-that overwhelm jury signals-and legal norms as well. The vindica-
tion of the jury invites us to improve the litigation system by refin-
ing and enlarging the use of the civil jury, not by eliminating it.
Policy in Poland, in 1976 Jarbuch fur Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie at 289 (cited in
note 13).
237 Compare the observation of Kulcsar that the "most important grounds for lay par-
ticipation . . . lies in the organizational-alien nature of the lay element." Kulcsar, People's
Assessors in the Courts at 126 (cited in note 13) (emphasis added). By this he refers to the
fact that the lay participant "generally does not formulate expectations concerning the or-
ganization which would influence his own career and he does not become a permanent par-,
ticipant in organization work.... [T]he expectations of the organization become less inter-
nalized in him." Id at 127.
"8' See Lempert, 73 Mich L Rev 644 (cited in note 195).
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TABLE 1
Trials as a Portion of Civil Terminations,
United States District Courts, 1961-1988
1961 1970 1980 1988
Total Civil
Terminations* 50,490"* 79,466 154,985 238,140
Total Trials 5,553 7,975 10,091 11,618
% of Terminations
that are Trials 11.0% 10.0% 6.5% 4.9%
Number of Jury Trials 2,585 3,409 3,920 5,920
% of Trials that
are Jury Trials 46.6% 42.7% 38.8% 51.0%
% of Terminations
that are Jury Trials 5.1% 4.3% 2.5% 2.5%
* Land condemnation cases excluded.
** Transferred and consolidated cases excluded.
Source: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual Reports, Table C-4, 1961,
1970, 1980, 1988.
[1990:
201] JURY AS REGULATOR 259
TABLE 2
Civil Jury Trials in United States District Courts, 1961
Jury Trials as
Number of % of Total Number of % of
Type Jury Trials Jury Trials Terminations Terminations
Tort 2,102 81.3% 19,182 11.0%
Contract 302 11.7% 13,018 2.3%
Tax 55 2.1% 1,415 3.9%
Real Property 40 1.5% 2,000 2.0%
Labor (FLSA, LMRA) 24 0.9% 2,273 1.1%
Forfeitures (other
than food & drug) 22 0.9% 1,148 1.9%
Antitrust 17 0.7% 287 5.9%
Civil Rights 6 0.2% 243 2.5%
Bankruptcy 4 0.2% 250 1.6%
Intellectual
. Property 4 0.2% 1,529 0.3%
Interstate Commerce 2 0.1% 334 0.6%
Other Statutory
Actions 2 0.1% 367 0.5%
Recovery 2 0.1% 2,407 0.1%
Food & Drug Forfeit-
ures 1 0.0% 1,054 0.1%
Local Officials 1 0.0% 87 1.1%
Securities, Commodities,
Exchanges 1 0.0% 200 0.5%
TOTAL 2,585 100.0% 50,490" 5.1%
* Total of terminations for all categories, including those in which there were no jury
trials.
Source: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual Report, 1961, Table C-4.
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TABLE 3
Civil Jury Trials in United States District Courts, 1970
Jury Trials as
Number of % of Total Number of % of
Type Jury Trials Jury Trials Terminations Terminations
Tort
Contract (excluding
Recovery)
Civil Rights
Tax
Real Property
Other Federal
Question
Labor (FLSA, LMRA, &
labor litigation)
Antitrust
All other Local
Jurisdiction
Intellectual
Property
Prisoner Petitions
Forfeitures (other
than liquor)
Liquor Forfeitures
Bankruptcy
Other U.S.
Domestic Relations
Social Security
TOTAL
2,593
459
97
83
36
76.1%
13.5%
2.8%
2.4%
1.1%
33 1.0%
0.9%
0.8%
11 0.3%
3,409
0.3%
0.3%
0.2%
0.1%
0.1%
0.1%
0.0%
0.0%
100.0%
* Total of terminations for all categories, including those in which there were no jury
trials.
Source: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual Report, 1970, Table C-4.
25,451
14,987
2,627
1,504
2,398
1,599
3,734
621
1,091
1,911
14,740
1,227
111
347
4,623
641
1,384
79,466*
10.2%
3.1%
3.7%
5.5%
1.5%
2.1%
0.9%
4.3%
1.0%
0.5%
0.1%
0.7%
4.5%
0.9%
0.0%
0.2%
0.1%
4.3%
JURY AS REGULATOR
TABLE 4
Civil Jury Trials in United States District Courts, 1980
Jury Trials as
Number of % of Total Number of % of
Jury Trials Jury Trials Terminations Terminations
Tort
Contract
Civil Rights
Other Federal
Question
Labor (FLSA, LMRA,
& labor litigation)
Prisoner Petitions
Antitrust
Tax
Intellectual
Property
Real Property
Other Local
Jurisdiction
Bankruptcy
Domestic Relations
Other U.S.
Forfeitures (other
than liquor)
Social Security
Recovery
TOTAL
2,169
686
520
55.3%
17.5%
13.3%
123 3.1%
98
97
74
63
37
24
9
9
3
3
2
2
1
3,920
2.5%
2.5%
1.9%
1.6%
0.9%
0.6%
0.2%
0.2%
0.1%
0.1%
0.1%
0.1%
0.0%
100%
* Total of terminations for all categories, including those in which there were no jury
trials.
Source: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual Report, 1980, Table C-4.
Type
29,420
30,287
13,116
5,678
8,285
21,447
1,644
3,307
3,559
6,138
301
1,776
266
3,908
2,680
9,584
13,417
154,985"
7.4%
2.3%
4.0%
2.2%
1.2%
0.5%
4.5%
1.9%
1.0%
0.4%
3.0%
0.5%
1.1%
0.1%
0.1%
0.0%
0.0%
2.5%
201]
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TABLE 5
Civil Jury Trials in United States District Courts, 1988
Jury Trials as
Number of % of Total Number of % of
Type Jury Trials Jury Trials Terminations Terminations
Tort 2,549 43.1% 44,145 5.8%
Civil Rights 1,213 20.5% 20,113 6.0%
Contract 1,123 19.0% 45,478 2.5%
Prisoner
Petitions 336 5.7% 37,261 0.9%
Other Federal
Question 261 4.4% 9,866 2.6%
Labor (FLSA, LMRA
& labor litigation) 135 2.3% 12,681 1.1%
Intellectual
Property 105 1.8% 5,798 1.8%
Real Property 52 0.9% 11,298 0.5%
Tax 47 0.8% 2,678 1.8%
Antitrust 38 0.6% 923 4.1%
Bankruptcy 25 0.4% 5,523 0.5%
Other U.S. 14 0.2% 4,477 0.3%
Forfeiture (other
than liquor) 11 0.2% 3,390 0.0%
Social Security 5 0.1% 14,102 0.0%
Recovery 3 0.1% 19,825 0.0%
Other Diversity 2 0.0% 66 3.0%
Constitutionality
of State Statute 1 0.0% 281 0.4%
TOTAL 5,920 100.1%* 238,140* 2.5%
* Total does not add up to 100% due to rounding.
* Total of terminations for all categories, including those in which there were no jury
trials.
Source: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual Report, 1988, Table C-4.
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Civil Jury Trials
TABLE 10
in Florida Circuit Court, 1988
Number of % of Total Number of Jury Trials as
Jury Trials Jury Trials Dispositions % of Dispositions
1,575
448
98
200
2,321
67.9%
19.3%
4.2%
8.6%
100%
33,411
54,529
51,062
101,765
240,767
4.7%
0.8%
0.2%
0.2%
1.0%
* "Other" data includes miscellaneous civil cases.
Source: National Center for State Courts, Annual Report, 1988 Part II, Table 2.
Type
Tort
Contract
Property
Other*
TOTAL
2011
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TABLE 13
Civil Jury Trials in Minnesota District Court, 1988
Number of % of Total Number of
Jury Trials Jury Trials Dispositions
Tort
Contract
Property
Other
TOTAL
481
122
81
113**
797
60.4%
15.3%
10.2%
14.2%
100.1%*
10,807
8,899
17,353
40,940
77,999
Jury Trials as
% of Dispositions
4.5%
1.4%
0.5%
0.3%
1.0%
* Percentage of total jury trials does not equal 100% due to rounding.
** "Other" civil trials do not include estate cases.
Sources: National Center for State Courts, Annual Report, 1988 Part II, Table 2.
TABLE 14
Civil Jury Trials in Texas District Court, 1988
Number of % of Total Number of
Jury Trials Jury Trials Dispositions
1,592
535
9
1,266
3,402
46.8%
15.7%
0.3%
37.2%
100%
40,674
55,878
439
127,450
224,441
Jury Trials as
% of Dispositions
3.9%
1.0%
2.1%
1.0%
1.5%
Sources: National Center for State Courts, Annual Report, 1988 Part II, Table 2.
Type
[1990:
Type
Tort
Contract
Property
Other
TOTAL
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Civil Jury Trials in
TABLE 15
Washington Superior Court, 1988
Number of % of Total
Jury Trials Jury Trials
82.8%
8.4%
3.1%
5.6%
99.9%*
Number of Jury Trials as
Dispositions % of Dispositions
10,888
13,237
13,192
19,843
57,160
4.6%
0.4%
0.1%
0.2%
1.1%
Percentage of total jury trials does not add up to 100% due to rounding.
Sources: National Center for State Courts, Annual Report, 1988 Part II, Table 2.
Type
Tort
Contract
Property
Other
TOTAL
201]

